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Strengthening Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Review of UN Peacekeeping Operations Audits

Faculty Research Working Paper Series

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Strengthening Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Review of UN Peacekeeping Operations Audits

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), established in the aftermath of World War II, play a crucial role in conflict resolution throughout the world. This paper reviews and analyzes 288 audits of UN peacekeeping missions over a five-year period. It discusses key operational and managerial weaknesses identified across multiple deployments in conflict zones around the world. The paper recommends specific administrative and operational changes that could materially improve the cost-effectiveness and overall impact of future peacekeeping missions.

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Executive Summary

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), established in the aftermath of World War II, play a crucial role in conflict resolution throughout the world. As of November 2021, the UN maintained 12 active peacekeeping missions staffed by over 80,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from over 100 countries. UNPKO's annual budget in 2020-21 was US\$6.58 billion. This paper looks at the operational effectiveness of those peacekeeping missions and how they could be improved. Its focus is not on high level peacekeeping strategy. Rather it identifies basic operational reforms that could be readily implemented and that would result in better peacekeeping outcomes at lower cost.

UNPKO missions face a unique set of operational, political and administrative challenges. Their mandates are often complex and wide-ranging. They operate in volatile and often hazardous environments. The consequences of operational failures are very significant. Many of the challenges they face are not new but are rooted in the ways that missions have been authorized, funded and resourced over the past 50 years.

Several UN reports have recognized significant deficiencies in peacekeeping operations, resulting in high-level restructuring efforts designed to enable better financial planning and management. Recent changes include the adoption of annual budgets, reorganization of departments, and decentralization of authority, reforms which may make it easier for the recommendations in this report to be adopted. However, they do not change our recommendations. Fundamental reforms to the structure of UNPKO have long been elusive, due in part to resistance from UN member states and to their reluctance to surrender control over individual peacekeeping mandates. Recurring operational problems have only reinforced this reluctance.

This report is principally concerned with operational and managerial challenges of running a Peacekeeping Mission and the administrative issues that materially affect the Mission's success. Although some of the recurring problems in UNPKO are not uncommon in large organizations (such as government bureaucracies and large corporate entities), the *consequences* of these shortcomings in peacekeeping missions can be severe.

Our evaluation is based on a detailed analysis of all non-classified audit reports produced by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) during the five-year period 2013/14- 2019/19. A total of 288 reports were analyzed, covering 22 peacekeeping missions of varying sizes and life cycle stages. The reports include more than 1,400 recommendations for operational improvements. In particular, the audit data show how the absence of centralized and flexible funding for UN missions stymies their initial deployment, reduces operational effectiveness and increases costs. The result is a cycle of weak operational performance that continues to be repeated.

OIOS grades the overall outcome of each audit as Satisfactory, Partially Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory. Of these 288 audit reports, only 8 (less than 3%) were graded “Satisfactory”. Missions repeatedly have trouble with Service Delivery, Resource Management, Supply Chain Management, Peacebuilding², Fiscal Management, and Planning. We look at the challenges in each of these areas, the key audit recommendations and the impediments to reform.

Our primary focus in this paper is to identify immediate administrative and operational changes that could materially improve the cost-effectiveness and overall impact and performance of UNPKOs. With funding for peacekeeping missions increasingly unreliable, it is more important than ever that they demonstrate positive results and make optimal use of limited resources.

PKOs must operate within the boundaries of two often competing forces. PKO leaders report to superiors at UN headquarters in New York and their operations are regulated by rules, directives, policies and procedures emanating from central UN headquarter (HQ). At the same time, operational decisions are discussed and implemented locally by senior PKO staff who have been delegated wide ranging powers. The resulting bureaucratic pressures lead to slow and inconsistent decision making and means that missions often fail to learn from best practices and repeat others’ past mistakes.

Our analysis highlights five frequently reoccurring themes which, if addressed, would help to break this cycle of “re-inventing the flat tire” and enable UNPKO to better support and implement its mandates:

1. More efficient initial mobilization of PKOs.
2. Greater fungibility in PKO resources (human, financial, physical assets).
3. Reprioritizing investment in PKO resources (particularly human resources).
4. Greater accountability at all operational, managerial and administrative levels.
5. Decisions based on timely operational data.

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² We use Peacebuilding as an umbrella term that includes Mission activities based on those mentioned in the [UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines](#) (ST/DPKO(09)/P3551): “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development... Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.” This use of this term *does not* refer to the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund, nor the Peacebuilding Support Office. For a list of the activities covered by the Peacebuilding Problem Group, see page 35.

Goodman Family fund. We thank the many individuals at Harvard and the United Nations who provided input and advice, including Frederick “Rick” Barton, Cristina Duarte, Scott Leland, Patrick Spearing, Paul Jackson and members of the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations	Name
CMS	Chief Mission Support
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
DFS	Department of Field Support
DMSPC	Department of Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DMS	Director Mission Support
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
FOC	Full Operating Capacity
GFSS	Global Field Support Strategy
HQ	Headquarters
IT	Information Technology
IOC	Initial Operating Capacity
IAD	Internal Audit Division
LCC	Local Contracts Committee
MOVCON	Movement and Control
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNSCOL (Lebanon)	Office of the United Nations Special coordinator for Lebanon
ORM	Operations and Resource Management
ORMS	Organizational Resilience Management System
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation(s)
PCC	Police Contributing Country
SAU	Self-Accounting Unit
SDM	Service Delivery Management
SPM	Special Political Mission(s)
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SCM	Supply Chain Management
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UMOJA	ERP software platform to manage UN's financial, human and physical resources
UN	United Nations
UNAMID (Darfur)	United Nations - African union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMI (Iraq)	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMA (Afghanistan)	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNSOM (Somalia)	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNDOF (Syria)	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau)	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA (Abyei)	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan)	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
MINUJUSTH (Haiti)	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
UNMIK (Kosovo)	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL (Liberia)	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS (South Sudan)	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
MINUSMA (Mali)	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSCA (CAR)	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
MONUSCO (DRC)	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNSMIL (Libya)	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSOA (Somalia)	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOS (Somalia)	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
VEC	Vehicle Establishment Committee

Introduction

The United Nations, established in the aftermath of World War II, was dedicated to saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”³ Since 1948, UN Peacekeepers have frequently been called upon to prevent disputes from escalating into war and to restore peace when conflict breaks out. Today, the UN operates 12 peacekeeping missions worldwide with more than 80,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from over 100 countries.

UN Peacekeeping operations are established by the UN Security Council. Under the UN Charter, the Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security, including the power to authorize peace operations, determine their mandates, and specify the maximum number of military and police personnel to be deployed. Since the UN has no army or police force of its own, it must generate the necessary funding, equipment, staff, troops and civilian police from Member States in order to fulfil a mission’s mandate. The power to approve peacekeeping expenditures rests with the General Assembly.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), established as a separate department of the UN Secretariat in 1992, is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, supporting and providing (on behalf of the Secretary-General) executive direction to all peacekeeping operations. DPKO works closely with the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is the focal point in the UN system for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The practice of United Nations peacekeeping has evolved significantly over the past six decades, but UNPKO Missions continue to be guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate.

Traditionally, peacekeeping operations were deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which a lasting settlement can be negotiated. The tasks assigned to such operations are essentially military in character; they may include Observations, supervision of cease-fire and/or interposition as a buffer between the parties.

Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has shifted towards more direct intervention. The 1992 Agenda for Peace called on the UN to restore peace and engage directly in peacebuilding across the world, “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war.”⁴

This gave rise to a new generation of “multi-dimensional” UN peacekeeping operations. These are typically deployed in the aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a wide mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. While the UN and the Security Council largely retain

³ (E/CN.4/138) Preamble [of the draft International Declaration on Human Rights] / the Committee on the Preamble, composed of the officers of the Commission on Human Rights

⁴ (A/47/277-S/24111) An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

control of peacekeeping, the number of actors involved has increased significantly. Peacekeeping missions are given extremely complex mandates with dozens of priority tasks. However, at the same time that demands on peacekeeping Missions have increased rapidly, it can still take years to propose, authorize and implement reforms that help to streamline and modernize operations⁵.

Mission Lifecycles

Although the trajectory of each peacekeeping operation evolves differently, for planning purposes their lifecycle can be divided into three broad phases: Start-Up (rapid deployment and mission start-up), Steady-State (mandate implementation), and Transition (hand-over, withdrawal and liquidation). Each phase of deployment presents its own specific challenges.

In general, the scale and speed of operations rise steadily during initial deployment and start-up, with spikes of activity as critical milestones and tasks are achieved. During startup, the mission strives to reach an initial operating capability, and eventually a full operating capability, so that mandate implementation can begin. Operations reach a plateau during steady-state, with efforts focused on carrying out the tasks set out in the Security Council mandate and achieving the objectives set out in the mission plan. The process of handover, withdrawal and liquidation begins following a decision by the Security Council. It involves the departure of mission personnel following the hand-over of all remaining tasks to partners, and the final disposal of mission assets and infrastructure in accordance with United Nations rules. Although conceptually distinct, in practice these three phases of the mission lifecycle frequently overlap.

Funding

Funding for peacekeeping operations is provided by the UN's member states on the basis of an agreed scale of assessment adopted by the General Assembly. The scale takes into account each state's relative economic wealth. However, the five permanent members of the Security Council are required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The scale can be renegotiated every three years by the General Assembly, although in practice adjustments are rare.

Member States provide military and police personnel for each Mission voluntarily. Peacekeepers are paid by their own governments, who are reimbursed from the mission budget at agreed-upon rates. Many countries also voluntarily make available, on a non-reimbursable basis, additional resources to support UN peacekeeping efforts.

The total approved UN peacekeeping budget for 2020-2021 was \$6.58 billion. However, there is no single unified budget. Rather, the General Assembly approves separate annual budgets for most active UN peace operations. Approval is a protracted and frequently

⁵ Jackson, P. (2019). Peacebuilding Initiatives in Africa. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.

contentious process, with developing states able to use their numerical strength in the General Assembly to force consideration of their views.

In addition, the U.N. peacekeeping financial year runs from July 1 to June 30, whereas the regular UN budget cycle - which includes the financing of special political missions - runs for two calendar years, starting on January 1st. Consequently, mandates and budget planning cycles for UN field missions often do not align.

UN peacekeeping missions frequently face cash-flow problems and financial strains due to late payment and withholding of member states' assessed contributions. The United States, for example, has often withheld a portion of its contributions, building up significant arrears⁶. The result is delayed reimbursements to troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and cash shortages, which increase risks to peacekeeping operations and impair the ability to deploy.⁷ The fiscal problems are exacerbated by structural weaknesses in UNPKO budgeting, including inefficient payment schedules and funding restrictions.

To help address these issues, the Secretary-General proposed reforms that have been adopted or are under consideration by the member states. For example, in July 2019 the General Assembly approved on a trial basis "the management of the cash balances of all active peacekeeping operations as a pool while maintaining the balances in separate funds for each mission" and asked the Secretary-General to "ensure that proper oversight and control are in place, that mandate implementation from the lending mission is not negatively impacted, and to report progress thereon annually."⁸ UN officials have reported that these reforms have somewhat improved the overall liquidity of active peacekeeping operations⁹.

History of Reforms

As UN peacekeepers began to be deployed more frequently during the second half of the 20th century, managerial inefficiencies and operational errors increasingly came into focus. In 1992 the General Assembly published "An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping"¹⁰. This emphasized the need for preventative diplomacy, clearer peacekeeping mandates, and firm commitments from donor countries. The paper proposed a \$450 million revolving humanitarian fund and the establishment of a \$1 billion Peace Endowment Fund. The highly visible and tragic failures of the UN missions in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s provided a further spur to reform efforts. In 1997 the General Assembly published a new set of proposals under the title "Renewing the UN: A Programme for Reform"¹¹. This program included creation of a

⁶ Since 1994, the US Congress has capped the United States' share of contributions to UN peacekeeping at 25% of the total budget, which has been lower than the amount assessed by the UN. For example, for 2021, the UN assessed the US share at 27.89%. In addition, the US accumulated arrears on its 25% budget due to various congressional policy holds. The President's FY 2022 budget would fully fund the US share of UN peacekeeping and pay \$920 million arrears that accrued since 2017 (CRS Report IF0597, 26 October 2021).

⁷ (A/73/809) Improving the financial situation of the United Nations : report of the Secretary-General.

⁸ (A/RES/73/307) Improving the financial situation of the United Nations : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly.

⁹ CRS, October 2021

¹⁰ (A/47/277-S/24111) An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

¹¹ (A/51/950/Add.3) Renewing the United Nations : a programme for reform : report of the Secretary-General.

\$1billion Revolving Credit Fund raised through voluntary contributions in an effort to tackle PKOs' chronic cash flow problems. The paper also suggested consolidating twelve United Nations Headquarter entities into five.

The year 2000 saw the publication of the "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" - otherwise known as the "Brahimi Report", after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel. The report called for increased funding, clearer mandates, earlier and more coherent mission planning, improved information management, transparent recruitment policies, flexibility in resource management, and a new global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment. The report was accepted, and some improvements made but many of the major problems it identified were not fully addressed.

In the Post-Brahimi era, there has been more focus on the concept of "integration" designed to foster a system-wide UN engagement in countries emerging from conflict. Often involving strategic partnerships between various UN organization, integration seeks to maximize the impact of all the various UN efforts in support of peace consolidation. A series of tools was introduced to bring this concept to life, including an Integrated Mission Planning Process. Another important reform was the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), approved by the General Assembly in 2010. This is an integrated services delivery model aimed at enabling faster response times for mission start-ups and improved support for mission operations. Efforts were also made to develop a doctrinal basis for UN peacekeeping work, with policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines to govern and support the work of mission staff.

Another initiative was the publication in 2011 of a report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, written by an independent group of senior advisers appointed by the Secretary-General. The report proposed practical measures to improve civilian support to conflict-affected countries, focusing on how to recruit and deploy the range of expertise required, as well as on how to transfer skills and knowledge to local actors.

In recent years, reports on the UN's peacebuilding architecture have been candid about the "gaping hole" in the UN's institutional machinery for building peace. In the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture¹², the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture described peacebuilding as an under-prioritized, under-resourced afterthought that suffers from the fragmentation of UN "silos." The Group called for greater coherence at the intergovernmental level, improved peacebuilding capability, more predictable financing, increasing peacebuilding funds, and better leadership.

Subsequent restructuring reports in 2017-2019 aimed to reduce "the fragmentation of efforts and ensuring a more joined up, whole-of -pillar approach to the delivery of mandates"¹³ by restructuring the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Peacebuilding Support Office. They proposed the establishment of a new Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, a Department of Peace Operations and a Standing Principals' Group of the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations. In addition, the reports

¹² (A/69/968 - S/2015/490) The challenge of sustaining peace: Report of the advisory group of experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

¹³ (A/72/525) Restructuring of the United Nations peace & security pillar. Report of the Secretary-General.

proposed replacing the Department of Field Support by a new Department of Operational Support, which would be “responsible for operational and transactional functions for and support to staff at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, the regional commissions and the field.”¹⁴ Such reforms¹⁵ began to be instituted towards the end of the period¹⁶ covered by this paper.

In 2019, a new framework for delegation of authority was implemented in order to decentralize authority, streamline operations and clarify roles, responsibilities, and accountability¹⁷. The Department of Management and Department of Field Support were reorganized into two new departments: a Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and a Department of Operational Support.

These architectural changes and high-level restructurings are badly needed and may create an environment in which it is easier to implement management reforms. They do not alter the analysis in this paper, which takes a bottom-up approach, and focuses on core administrative and operational challenges identified in hundreds of audit reports. Our recommendations will provide the reformed UN structure with a set of priorities for ways to improve PKO effectiveness in the field.

Audit Process

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was created in 1994 to assist the UN Secretary-General in fulfilling oversight responsibilities over UN resources and staff. Its Internal Audit Division (IAD) conducts audits, monitoring, inspections and investigations. It uses a risk-based approach to direct audit assignments at areas where achievement of UN objectives is at higher risk.

IAD defines auditable activities (“audit focuses”) as a program, specific function, process or initiative. Risks are assessed in the context of the objectives, mandates and strategic plans through risk questionnaires, interviews, workshops with relevant management and staff, analysis of historical data, and other sources. Identified risks are then measured and scored according to the weighting of perceived impact, the likelihood and level of effective internal controls. Upon completing its engagement and drafting processes, IAD publishes a Final Audit Report. This is “a detailed document that combines both positive results and deficiencies in controls, determined against key operational and control objectives of the activities, processes or unit under review, including the cause and impact of reported deficiencies, if any, on achievement of such objectives.”

Audit Reports include the following elements: Summary description of the background; Objective, scope and methodology of the audit, and the rationale for conducting it; overall conclusions; Detailed discussion of the audit results; and recommendations for addressing issues identified. OIOS maintains all recommendations in an automated audit management

¹⁴ (A/72/492) Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all. Report of the Secretary-General

¹⁵ (A/RES/72/199) Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar.

¹⁶ (A/72/707 - S/2018/43) Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary-General.

¹⁷ (ST/SGB/2019/2) Delegation of authority in the administration of the Staff Regulations and Rules and the Financial Regulations and Rules.

system in order to analyze recommendations and monitor the status of their implementation. Implementation of critical recommendations is monitored on a quarterly basis, while the implementation of important recommendations is monitored annually. OIOS is responsible for reviewing the PKO's progress updates and making the final determination as to the status of the recommendation (i.e., whether the recommendation is still in progress, or whether the recommendation should be closed as implemented and so forth.). In order to determine whether a recommendation should be closed, auditors must review the evidence provided by the PKO, assess its credibility, and establish whether the action taken is valid and sustainable.

Key Challenges

We reviewed all 288 non-classified OIOS audit reports of UN peacekeeping missions over the period 2013/14-2018/19. The reports cover 22 peacekeeping missions of varying sizes and stages. Many missions were audited multiple times, for different areas of their operations and during different stages of their life cycle.¹⁸ The 288 reports contained a total of 1439 recommendations, not including a number of audit Observations and recommendations that were redacted by OIOS due to the sensitive nature of their content.

At the conclusion of each audit, OIOS grades the *overall* outcome as either “Satisfactory”, “Partially Satisfactory” or “Unsatisfactory”. For the purposes of this study, we assumed a grade of Partially Satisfactory to reports where no specific grade was provided.

Only eight of the 288 reports (fewer than 3%) were awarded a full grade of “Satisfactory” (see Table 1).

¹⁸ For the purposes of this study, PKOs include both Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.

Table 1: Status of 288 Audit Reports by UN Mission

Mission	Partially Satisfactory (PS)	Satisfactory (S)	Unsatisfactory (U)	Total
Abyei	6	1	4	11
Afghanistan	13			13
CAR	14		2	16
Côte d'Ivoire	17		5	22
Cyprus	2	1		3
Darfur	33	3	8	44
DRC	32		7	39
Guinea-Bissau	1			1
Haiti	1			1
India-Pakistan	1			1
Iraq	14			14
Kosovo	1			1
Lebanon (UNFIL)	26	1		27
Lebanon (UNSCOL)	2			2
Liberia	15	2	1	18
Libya	1			1
Mali	12		5	17
Somalia (UNSOA)	8		4	12
Somalia (UNSOM)	1			1
Somalia (UNSOS)	13		1	14
South Sudan	19		6	25
Syria	5			5
Grand Total	237	8	43	288

The pattern was similar with respect to individual audit Observations. Of the 1,439 Observations, only three were rated Satisfactory (see table 2 below).

Table 2: Status of Audit Observations by UN Mission

UN PKO Mission	Partially Satisfactory (PS)	Satisfactory (S)	Unsatisfactory (U)	Total
Abyei	18	0	23	41
Afghanistan	41			41
CAR	96		16	112
Côte d'Ivoire	81		33	114
Cyprus	18	1		19
Darfur	132	2	36	170
DRC	149		47	196
Guinea-Bissau	10			10
Haiti	6			6
India-Pakistan	6			6
Iraq	54			54
Kosovo	8			8
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	139			139
Lebanon (UNSCOL)	11			11
Liberia	75		5	80
Libya	1			1
Mali	78		33	111
Somalia (UNSOA)	40		25	65
Somalia (UNSOM)	9			9
Somalia (UNSOS)	54		9	63
South Sudan	120		44	164
Syria	19			19
Grand Total	1,165	3	271	1,439

To facilitate analysis, we categorized OIOS's audit recommendations into six distinct problem groups that broadly mirror the components of PKOs in the theatre of operation:

1. Fiscal
2. Supply Chain Management
3. Operations & Resource Management
4. Service Delivery Management
5. Peacebuilding
6. Planning

Table 3: Audit Observations per PKO by Problem Group

UN Missions	Service Delivery Mgmt	Operations & Resource Mgmt	Fiscal	Supply Chain Mgmt	Peace-building	Planning	Total
Abyei	23	9	0	9	0	0	41
Afghanistan	16	10	5	5	5	0	41
CAR	54	20	7	6	25	0	112
Côte d'Ivoire	51	26	6	26	5	0	114
Cyprus	10	0	0	9	0	0	19
Darfur	60	26	7	22	55	0	170
DRC	61	35	5	50	36	9	196
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	10	0	10
Haiti	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
India-Pakistan	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
Iraq	25	16	0	8	5	0	54
Kosovo	0	0	0	0	8	0	8
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	38	52	6	13	24	6	139
Lebanon (UNSCOL)	0	7	0	4	0	0	11
Liberia	21	23	5	26	5	0	80
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Mali	43	27	12	18	11	0	111
Somalia (UNSOA)	22	17	4	22	0	0	65
Somalia (UNSOM)	0	0	0	0	9	0	9
Somalia (UNSOS)	33	9	0	17	0	4	63
South Sudan	53	48	11	42	10	0	164

Syria	0	14	5	0	0	0	19
Total	510	339	73	283	214	20	1,439
	35%	24%	5%	20%	15%	1%	100%

1. Fiscal Activities

PKOs' fiscal activities include accounting and budgetary management. Accounting activities (cash management, bank reconciliations, cost center reports and management accounts) are the responsibility of the Finance Section, which makes up part of the PKO's administrative services. Budgeting is managed separately by the PKO's Head of Administration Director/Chief of Mission Support.

PKOs frequently found it difficult to provide accurate and realistic budget estimates. There were particular problems related to tracking expenditures, monitoring and minimizing budget redeployments and variances and in reducing the concentration of expenditures in the last quarter of the fiscal year.

These fiscal problems are partly the result of the inherently volatile and unpredictable nature of peacekeeping. In addition, prior to the introduction of a fully integrated ERP system, missions relied on a patchwork of legacy data management systems that were not interconnected, making it difficult to produce accurate financial reports on a timely basis. During 2013-2108, UN accounting transitioned to a new ERP platform known as Umoja. Umoja enabled more timely data to be produced and interconnected with other areas of PKO operations, accounting and budgeting.

However, this area continues to be challenging. The nature and speed of PKO operations result in cash being received and disbursed very quickly. There is a constant need for funds, rapid spending and high volume of cash and bank transactions. In this environment, current operations are frequently prioritized while recovery of outstanding balances is neglected. There are also problems related to staffing, security, training and changing requirements.

Table 4: Fiscal Activities: Number of Audit Reports and Observations by Audit Focus

Fiscal Activities		
Audit Focus	# Of Audit Reports	# Of Observations
Accounting and Trust Funds	13	55
Budget Formulation and Monitoring	6	18
Total	19	73

Table 5: Fiscal Activities: Status of Audit Reports by Audit Focus

Fiscal Activities				
Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Total
Accounting and Trust Funds	12	1	0	13
Budget Formulation and Monitoring	6	0	0	6
Total	18	1	0	19

Table 6: Fiscal Activities: Number of Audit Reports and Observations by UN Mission

Fiscal Activities		
UN Mission	# Of Audits	# Of Audit Observations
Afghanistan	1	5
CAR	1	7
Côte d'Ivoire	1	6
Darfur	2	7
DRC	2	5
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	4	6
Liberia	1	5
Mali	2	12
Somalia (UNSOA)	1	4
Somalia (UNSOS)	1	0
South Sudan	2	11
Syria	1	5
Total	19	73

Challenges, Audit Recommendations and Impediments to Reform

Only 7% of all audits were conducted on Fiscal activities in 2013-18 (19 out of 288 audits). This is partly due to limited resourcing in IAD, as well as its prioritization of what are seen to be the more 'material' elements of PKO operations, especially Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery Management. Of the 288 audits conducted between 2013 and 2018, accounting and trust funds were amongst the most frequently audited issue (13 audits out of 288). These accounted for 55 out of a total of 1,439 recommendations.

The key problems identified were:

- a) Late payments and receipts
- b) Inflexible budget process

a) Late Payments and Receipts

One of the most prevalent audit Observations was the need for PKOs to improve management of outstanding accounts receivable and accounts payable. PKOs have a varied clientele and are asked to manage transactions for staff members (salaries and allowances, recoveries for medical costs and accommodation charges), military and police contingents,

other UN organizations in-country (for common services provided by the PKO), quick impact projects, contractors, consultants, and local and international vendors.

Mission budgets are approved more than a year after the Mission's mandate is approved. Consequently, PKOs are often starved of funds during the ramp-up phase. This obliges them to borrow from other PKO accounts to fund start-up costs and then repay those accounts before their budgets are authorized. Budgets for steady-state missions must be approved annually by June, making it difficult for HQ or the PKOs themselves to engage in contractual commitments that overlap financial periods.

Additional cash crunches can also be caused by Member States paying their assessments to the UN late. The audits of four mid-size Missions (Liberia 2013/117, Afghanistan 2013/141, Iraq 2014/042 and UNOCI Côte d'Ivoire 2013/142) all note the need to monitor and settle outstanding accounts receivable from a combination of Member States, UN Agencies and PKO staff. Since all four Missions were well-resourced with established procedures, the audit Observations are the result of poor financial and administrative management and a lack of accountability.

Audits for larger PKOs that manage larger budgets and more accounts encountered the same challenges (South Sudan 2014/026, Darfur 2013/116 and Democratic Republic of Congo 2014/043). Poor cash management is also an issue for PKOs. Mali 2017/101 recorded a need for better documentation, verification and processing for payments and recoveries. The audit for the long-standing Mission of UNDOF (Syria) 2017/136 documented the need for a month-end procedure for staff account receivables.

Audit reports typically focus on cash management deficiencies without examining their root causes. Although PKOs generally have sufficient numbers of staff able to undertake standard accounting procedures (receivables, payables, bank reconciliations and so forth), PKO's would benefit from increased awareness and technical training in areas such as Activity-based costing. The main impediment to reform is the absence of clear benchmarks, such as number of days before receivables are written off or strict deadlines for payables to be cleared from the books.

Additionally, senior management who do not devote sufficient attention to monitoring cash flows are not held accountable. This is despite the fact that poor cash management not only impairs the efficiency of the PKO but also risks serious humanitarian or security problems by jeopardizing disbursement of funds to host country partners, vendors, UN police and military contingents, or local staff salaries.

b) Inflexible Budget Process

There are many organizations in the public and private sector in which budgets are relatively inflexible. However, the lack of flexibility in the PKO context poses special problems and real dangers, as described in the following examples.

PKO budgets are fixed annually. They are finalized in advance of each 12-month period, with mid-year, supplementary budgets discouraged, even where events materially affect costs or change fundamental budget assumptions. For example, a delay in presidential and

provincial elections in Afghanistan left the Afghan Mission with large variances caused by shifting the related expenses to a future budget period.

Second, it is often difficult for *start-up* PKOs to produce a realistic first year budget. PKO mandates are broad and, initially Missions have limited experience with local economic, social, security and environmental conditions. PKOs ramping *down* have a different set of challenges: they are typically a lower priority at HQ and find it harder to obtain funds or justify additional costs for cancellation of contracts, payment of termination indemnities to staff, or disposal of obsolete equipment. For example, the Liberia Mission ended with large budget variances due to a decision of the Troop Contributing Country (TCC) and the Police Contributing Country (PCC) to repatriate their personnel earlier than expected.

Third, PKO budgets are not fungible across different Missions. Member States prefer PKO budgets to be managed and reported separately to enable them to track their contributions by individual PKO. Consequently, it is not possible to transfer excess funds from well-established PKOs to start-up or ramp-down missions that require additional funding. Missions that are short of funds must either freeze staff recruitment or cut key operational functions, as observed in the audit reports.

Furthermore, there is only partial flexibility to adjust budgets with a Mission. Subject to clearance from HQ, the PKOs are allowed to transfer funds between line items *within* Operational Costs (such as between air operations and engineering). But PKOs is *not permitted* to transfer from Category 1 budget line items (military and police costs) or Category 2 (staff costs) to operational costs. This degree of inflexibility can have serious consequences in the UN context, where the Mission is dealing with fast-moving events on the ground while managing a budget that was effectively set in stone a year earlier.

Finally, neither overspending the budget nor *underspending* by more than 5% is allowed. Underspending is viewed as inefficient management of resources by the PKO. Both damage the internal credibility of the PKO and may affect future resource allocation. Consequently, PKOs often resort to suboptimal spending towards the end of the budget cycle. They often postpone major capital expenditures until the last quarter of the budget year, even though operational requirements might have been met if they had been purchased earlier.

Five audits conducted in 2017 (South Sudan 2017/113, Democratic Republic of Congo 2017/128, Mali 2017/142, Central African Republic 2017/139, and Lebanon 2017/148) highlighted the need to reform the budget process¹⁹. The reports recommended better monitoring of expenditures, including using the Umoja platform to format meaningful budget projections, together with significantly increased budget training to improve the timeliness and accuracy of budget preparation.

However, the budget process remains fragmented, inflexible and labour-intensive, making reform difficult. The UN Secretary-General lacks the independence and authority to shift resources between programs without prior approval from the member States. The existing Working Capital Fund is too small to meet current needs.

¹⁹ Many of the issues were highlighted in General Assembly document (A/72/492/Add.1) of September 2017, entitled "Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: improving and streamlining the programme planning and budget process."

Recommendations for Fiscal Activities

- i. Mobilization: Establish a Rainy-Day Fund equivalent to 25% of all PKO approved budgets from the prior year as a means to provide PKOs with cash advances and greater flexibility to respond quickly to operational needs.
- ii. Fungibility: HQ should on an annual basis revise or maintain the authority given for PKOs to redeploy resources within the budget period.
- iii. Investment: Train all management in cash management and budgetary control (including results-based budgeting and zero-based budgeting)
- iv. Accountability: Fully utilize all UMOJA reporting tools in order to produce monthly management accounts on a timely basis.
- v. Data: Align all UN budget cycles within the UN Secretariat (HQ, PKOs and SPMs) and consider shifting to uniform annual budgets to improve financial planning.

1. Supply Chain Management

Supply Chain Management (SCM) is critical to PKO operations. It includes the procurement, transportation, management and storage of physical supplies and materials required to support the PKO's Mission. Almost all supplies and equipment must be imported to Missions. Since PKOs cover a wide geographic area and are located in logistically challenging regions, supply lines are frequently long, risky, and traverse volatile terrain. The four key component parts of SCM for PKOs are Local Procurement/ Contract Management, Movement Control, Asset Management/Disposal and Warehouse Management.

The vast majority of Procurement and Contract Management is undertaken by UN headquarters. Contracts for large items such as helicopters, vehicles, generators, and prefabricated buildings are negotiated centrally and the procured assets delivered directly to the PKO or kept in reserve at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. Fuel is procured locally although contracts must be approved and monitored by HQ. Other local procurement can include items such as building construction and maintenance supplies, casual labor, food items, and office equipment. Local procurement in these areas is encouraged in order to help local economies.

Movement Control manages the transportation and movement of goods, services and people in and out of the Mission's theatre of operation. Asset Management/Disposal is concerned with the receipt, inspection, management and disposal of the PKO's assets. Asset Management therefore plays a key role in a PKO constructing and maintaining its core infrastructure and key operational supplies. Warehouse Management is responsible for the physical storage of assets maintained by the Mission.

In the period 2013-19, SCM activities were responsible for 16% of all unsatisfactory audits (6 out of 38) and for 15% of all unsatisfactory audit Observations (36 out of a total of 249). Common problems include delays in contract extensions, limited competition, and weaknesses in contract management. Weak supply chain management increases the risk of disruption in the delivery of goods and services for operational requirements.

The key problems identified in the audits were:

- a) Inadequate solicitation and bidding processes for procurement
- b) Under-resourced Movement Control
- c) Obsolete asset management systems
- d) Inefficient planning in Warehouse Management

Table 7: Supply Chain Management: Audit Reports and Observation by Audit Focus

SCM Activities		
Audit Focus	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Asset Management and Disposal	16	71
Movement and Control (MOVCON)	9	37
Procurement and Contract Management	28	138
Warehouse Management	6	37
Total	59	283

Table 8: Supply Chain Management: Status of Audit Reports by Audit Focus

SCM Activities				
Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Total
Asset Management and Disposal	14	1	1	16
Movement and Control (MOVCON)	7	1	1	9
Procurement and Contract Management	25	1	2	28
Warehouse Management	4		2	6
Total	50	3	6	59

Table 9: Supply Chain Management: Number of Audit Reports and Observations by UN Mission

SCM Activities		
UN Missions	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Abyei	2	9
Afghanistan	2	5
CAR	2	6
Côte d'Ivoire	5	26
Cyprus	2	9
Darfur	7	22
DRC	10	50
Haiti	1	6
Iraq	2	8

Lebanon	3	13
Lebanon (UNSCOL)	1	4
Liberia	5	26
Mali	3	18
Somalia (UNSOA)	4	22
Somalia (UNSOS)	4	17
South Sudan	6	42
Total	59	283

Challenges, Audit Recommendations and Impediments to Reform

a) Inadequate solicitation and bidding processes for procurement

Local procurement and contract management is one of PKOs' least efficient activities and one of the most susceptible to fraud, profiteering and corruption. PKOs operate in areas where there is little government control, making the Missions susceptible to corrupt and sanctioned suppliers. In addition, since local banks may be unreliable or non-existent, transactions may need to be conducted in cash.

The process of evaluating vendors and assessing bids is prone to subjectivity, interference, mistakes, and forged or fabricated vendor data. There is also a high potential for confidentiality breaches. For example, in Liberia between 2013 and 2015, local vendors coerced procurement staff into sharing details of submitted bids. This subsequently led to cancellations of contracts, delayed operations and damage to the Mission's reputation and goodwill. These challenges are common across missions at all stages of their life cycle.

The results of technical evaluations and the bidding process are presented by procurement staff to a Local Contracts Committee, which is appointed by the PKO. The LCC then awards contracts on the basis of value for money. In practice, however, the LCC's recommendations may be overridden by operational exigencies. In addition, poor planning, delayed requisitioning, and a protracted procurement process results in many "ex-post facto" awards (where contracts are approved *after* the service or item has been delivered).

The audits of growing PKOs, such as South Sudan 2013/126 and 2015/133, and established PKOs, such as Democratic Republic of Congo 2013/104 and 2016/065, illustrate many of the problems in local procurement. Recommendations included a review of registered vendors, better planning and reporting of ex-post facto cases and improved processes for exigent requisitions. The audits also identified the need for a revision to the composition of the LCC, improved quality of technical evaluations and more timely staff training. The audit report of Liberia 2014/101 recommended improvements in acquisition and contract management, market surveying, delivery of solicitation documents, fair evaluation of bids and timely performance bonds for vendors.

The major impediment to implementing such recommendations is shortage of trained staff to oversee the acquisition process at the outset of a deployment when Missions have an

urgent need for critical goods and services. This leads to poor practices that are then difficult to correct.

b) Under-resourced Movement Control

The major challenge for Movement Control (MOVCON) is linked to safety and security. Missions are dependent on the safe transportation of goods and people in what is usually a volatile local environment. Cargo must be screened, contractors monitored, and dangerous supplies transported according to strict rules. MOVCON's success is heavily dependent on hiring, training and retaining of highly skilled staffers and on implementing clear policies and procedures. Without such capabilities Missions quickly run into operational roadblocks.

Missions often provide transportation services for UN Agencies, international NGOs, military contingents and government institutions, often without adequate preparation, planning, and budgeting. For example, in 2014 the Afghan Mission's MOVCON section was required to transfer presidential ballot papers to remote locations. Untimely reimbursement for such services leads to budgetary shortfalls for the mission. Mission partners are sometimes uncooperative, and missions do not possess the political authority to withhold future help from partners until past services have been paid for.

The unsatisfactory audit Somalia 2014/123 focused on the challenges faced by a PKO in recovering costs from the African Union Mission in Somalia. It highlighted the need for better procedures, monitoring tools, inspections and training.

c) Obsolete Asset Management Systems

The major difficulties in asset management related to the shortcomings of obsolete systems, particularly Galileo, a bespoke legacy asset management system that was in use by PKOs during the period under review in this paper. Such systems are labor intensive to use and unable to generate real-time management information. Consequently, physical assets were frequently misplaced, unaccounted for, or obsolete even before they could be deployed.

Asset management is generally not prioritized in workplans and is frequently poorly staffed and underfunded. In addition, there is no clear accountability for assets. For example, whilst responsibility for reporting the number of vehicles rested with the Asset Management Section, responsibility for the acquisition, use and write off for those same assets remained with the Self Accounting Unit – in this case the Transport Section. The audits illustrate the lack of overall control that PKOs have over their assets. For example, Mali 2016/151 highlighted the need for oversight and monitoring of assets in Galileo. The audit of asset disposal activities for Darfur 2016/104 highlights the problems faced by asset managers in enforcing oversight and follow-up procedures.

Audits showed that problems relating to asset management tended to worsen as Missions become older and more established. Audits for startup missions tended to focus on improving policies and procedures, whereas audits for downsizing or liquidating PKOs

tended to be more about physical disposal and material book write offs of lost, unaccounted for or obsolete equipment. The inability of the Galileo system to provide the necessary real-time data and flexibility for managers has been an impediment to implementing audit recommendations, which has been only partially remedied by recent efforts to migrate to a complex new system.²⁰

d) Inefficient planning in Warehouse Management

Warehouse management is an area of weakness for all PKOs. Missions typically underprioritize warehouse management while committing greater resources towards procurement and transportation of assets. Warehouses must be constructed, secured and maintained in a manner that is safe for both staff and the warehoused supplies. This was particularly difficult for start-up Missions such as South Sudan and Mali as well as for large Missions, such as Darfur and Democratic Republic of Congo, where warehouses had to be constructed in many remote locations. Tracking supplies is difficult due to inadequate policies and procedures for their receipt, storage and disbursement. This results in assets being lost, stolen, or rendered obsolete before they are even used. The head of each Self Accounting Unit is responsible for the equipment under their charge. This diffusion of accountability leads to multiple inefficient practices. In missions located in remote parts of host countries, each section utilized its own warehouse. This led to a costly duplication of limited resources.

The two unsatisfactory audits and 13 recommendations from audits 2014/138 and 2015/006 for Darfur and South Sudan respectively highlight the results of these practices. Recommendations included improved warehouse infrastructure (fencing, perimeter lighting, and so forth), as well as the need to segregate duties and keep accurate records. Audit 2017/072 for Democratic Republic of Congo and 2017/154 Somalia identified problems with warehouse procedures and staff training. A key recommendation in the audits is the longstanding need to implement centralized warehousing in PKOs.

Recommendations for Supply Chain Management

- i. **Mobilization:** Increase the number of global contracts/procurement agreements and maximize the number of procurement processes that are completed prior to PKO deployment.
- ii. **Fungibility:** Centralized warehousing should become mandatory at all regional logistics hubs and with each PKO.
- iii. **Investment:** Non-PKO clients should pay in advance for requested support and implement a timely cost recovery mechanism for all services rendered to UN agencies and partners.

²⁰ A newer system, UMOJA, was introduced in 2018-2019, after a lengthy period of decommissioning Galileo and transitioning to Umoja, training users and making local adjustments. The Umoja system is designed to provide a more a comprehensive picture of the 'availability of goods' across global missions, and to improve sourcing, tracking, and managing inventory, equipment, and assets. As with many largescale migrations, the implementation was complex and still undergoing revisions in 2020. In April 2021, the UN reported a data breach associated with criminal cyber hacking in to UMOJA systems.

- iv. **Accountability:** Enforce mandatory submission of financial disclosures and declarations of conflicts of interest for all procurement and control management staff and adopt a clear disciplinary policy for staffers who fail to follow standard procurement processes.
- v. **Data:** Better use of and more timely data (including greater efficacy of ERP systems, processes to monitor lead times of arrivals of purchases and key performance indicators across all areas of SCM).

2. Operations and Resource Management

In order to achieve its mandate, a Mission must be able to secure sufficient human and physical resources and to allocate them efficiently at each stage of Mission operations. Operations & Resource Management (ORM) activities are thus a key part of a PKO's organizational backbone.

Between 2013 and 2018, one quarter of all audits conducted were on ORM (70 out of a total 288 audits). ORM activities can be broken down into four components: Human Resources, Information Technology, Back Office Services and Contingent Owned Equipment. Human Resource Management (HRM) underpins all areas of PKO operations. Forty of the audits focused on HRM, resulting in 186 audit recommendations. The audits cover recruitment, training, retention and workforce planning for staff, consultants and contractors. Information Technology audits focused on the early stages of adoption of Umoja, a new ERP system. Between 2013 and 2018 regional support offices were created in secure locations such as Entebbe and Kuwait to provide certain Back Office services to individual missions. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) includes military-owned and managed equipment that troop-contributing countries bring to a PKO in support of its mandate.

The key problems identified in the audits were:

- a) Personnel planning
- b) Lack of budgetary independence for support services
- c) Under-resourced IT adoption
- d) Absence of basic governance for Contingent Owned Equipment

Table 10: Operations & Resource Management: Audit Reports & Observations by Audit Focus

ORM Activities		
Audit Focus	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Back Office Service Centers	5	20
Conduct and Discipline	7	42
Contingent Owned Equipment	12	46
Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	15	102
Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	12	53
Individual Consultants / Contractors	5	17
Leave and Attendance	9	38
Records Management	2	9

Regional HQs	1	3
Welfare Activities	1	9
Total	69	339

Table 11: Operations & Resource Management: Status of Audit Reports by Audit Focus

ORM Activities				
Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Total
Back Office Service Centres	3		2	5
Conduct and Discipline	7			7
Contingent Owned Equipment	10	1	1	12
Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	14		1	15
Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	10		2	12
Individual Consultants / Contractors	5			5
Leave and Attendance	9			9
Records Management	2			2
Regional HQs	1			1
Welfare Activities	1			1
Total	62	1	6	69

Table 12: Operations & Resource Management: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by UN Mission

ORM Activities		
UN Missions	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Abyei	4	9
Afghanistan	3	10
CAR	3	20
Côte d'Ivoire	6	26
Darfur	7	26
DRC	6	35
Iraq	5	16
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	7	52
Lebanon (UNSCOL)	1	7

Liberia	5	23
Mali	5	27
Somalia (UNSOA)	3	17
Somalia (UNSOS)	2	9
South Sudan	8	48
Syria	4	14
Total	69	339

Challenges, Audit Recommendations and Impediments to Reform

a) Personnel Planning

The main problem facing human resource management in all PKOs is the absence of strategic and holistic workforce planning. A combination of inflexible budgets, uncertain funding and rigid procedures makes it difficult to ensure timely personnel recruitment, training, retention and redeployment.

Audits show the recruitment process for many posts is slow and bureaucratic, often requiring final approval from HQ. This leads to staff shortages, most acutely in start-up PKOs. The ramp-up phase of a Mission is critical to building local relationships and knowledge. The lack of key staff in this phase often causes delays of up to three years in a Mission achieving required levels of operational effectiveness. The recruiting deficiencies also lead to insecurity and stress among staff and limits PKOs' ability to develop a workforce succession plan or a human capital strategy.

Missions tend to use staff vacancies as a budgetary tool, often over-budgeting and maintaining contingency reserves where possible. Staff costs are one of the largest budget line items under a PKO's control and thus PKOs tend to use recruitment delays as a way to control costs.

The three unsatisfactory audits on the recruitment of national staff and individual contractors (South Sudan Audit 2015/091, Mali Audit 2015/019 and Darfur Audit 2014/112) all noted similar themes: the need for a plan and a roster of qualified candidates, lack of clear procedures for the review, recording and reconciliation of data and the lack of sufficient training and capacity in HR. The audits of the use of international consultants and individual contractors (South Sudan Audit 2015/180 and Darfur Audit 2015/153) highlighted the absence of guidance and procedures for needs assessment and deficiencies in vetting, processing and hiring of candidates.

Another set of challenges relates to the weakness of staff performance evaluations and internal justice systems. These limit the ability to motivate and reward high performing staff, identify skills gaps and appropriately manage poorly performing or underperforming staff. Failing to distinguish between strong and weaker performance makes it difficult to intervene in a timely fashion (for example, to provide recognition, training, or changes in staffing) and leads to morale problems.

b) Lack of Budgetary Independence for Support Services

As part of its Global Service Delivery Model the Department of Field Support (DFS) shifted certain common services such as payroll, payments, leave and attendance, and travel away from the mission area to Back Office Support Centers in more secure locations. The intent was to harmonize processes and reduce the footprint of staff stationed in hardship locations.

The Centers were not given their own independent budgets but were funded by contributions from their client PKOs. These contributions were based on a formula relating to the size of the PKO and the amount of throughput expected. Consequently, the Centers had little control over their own funding or their costs. The Centers each had their own leadership and management structures, but their performance was overseen and reviewed by a committee of Directors/Chiefs of Mission Support (DMSs/CMSs) from client Missions.

This arrangement resulted in institutional rigidities and confusion over governance. Divided loyalties undermined the Support Office's management and leadership. For example, a certain percentage of staff assigned to the Kuwait Joint Support Office was funded by the Iraqi Mission and the remainder by the Afghan Mission. This led to situations where staff prioritized transactions depending on which Mission (Afghanistan or Iraq) was funding their post.

Audits did not directly address the inflexible budget nor the divided governance structure that were the root cause of the problems. Rather they focused on the symptoms: managerial, processing and procedural shortfalls. Recommendations included the need to harmonize procedures, processes and reports and to improve mechanisms for collecting and reviewing data.

c) Under-Resourced IT Adoption

A series of 12 audits was conducted between 2014 and 2016 when PKOs were transitioning to a new ERP system, Umoja. The audits concentrated on large and medium-sized established missions that held the most data. A total of 90 recommendations was made.

The rollout of Umoja was undertaken within a short timeline and the transition process was generally under-resourced. Although internal experts were provided, most of the training was undertaken using existing PKO resources. PKOs were obliged to divert resources to train key staff, or to temporarily deploy staff to other PKOs in order to meet their implementation timetable. Consequently, mistakes were often repeated, and some best practices not adopted.

The audit of the pilot mission, Lebanon 2014/033, identified many issues that continued to appear later on. The audit recommended integrated planning between the older system (IPSAS) and the new Umoja system. It highlighted the need for adequate resourcing, training and for clear processes to be established with regard to data mapping, cleansing and transfer.

The unsatisfactory audit # 2015/087 of Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates the difficulties encountered by a large PKO and the failure to incorporate lessons learned from the pilot mission. The audit focused on poor preparations to transfer data from legacy systems to Umoja, including running both systems in parallel. Other audits, particularly of growing PKOs such as South Sudan # 2015/125 and Mali # 2015/131, reported similar shortcomings with respect to procedures for monitoring and reporting progress as well as the need for additional training. A follow-up audit in Lebanon #2016/097 found that although progress had been made, there was still a need for a clear organization structure as well as for greater operational control over data transfer, testing and administration.

The difficulties in this area are in part the result of the unique scope of each Mission, which makes it difficult to develop standard templates against which progress can be measured. As a result, lessons are learned very slowly, mistakes are repeated, and best practices are ignored or slow to be adopted.

d) Lack of Basic Governance Mechanisms for Contingent Owned Equipment

Audits show that the management and operation of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) suffered from a lack of basic governance, weak procedural mechanisms and lack of training. Audits focused on the need of the COE function to be adequately resourced (staffing and financially), particularly for large PKOs, where a substantial amount of equipment needs to be inspected over a wide geographic area. Such a need is especially acute during periods when contingents are rotating in and out of the country. The audits highlighted the need for a clear plan and a process to record and report data efficiently to both HQ and Troop Contributing Countries as well as to put in place appropriate remedial measures.

The major impediment to improving Contingent Owned Equipment is the lack of clear governance. COE is operated and managed by the Mission's Force Commander. However, monitoring COE (on which reimbursements to the contingents is ultimately based) is the responsibility of the civilian Direction of Mission Support. Both the military and civilian components of the Missions report to different parties within and beyond the mission area. This leads to poor coordination, a lack of accountability and frequent discrepancies that ultimately delay the reimbursements the United Nations makes to Troop Contributing Countries for use of their equipment.

The unsatisfactory audit # 2016/002 of Mali illustrates the systemic problems associated with COE management. The audit recommended that a COE working group be established to monitor, record and liaise with other PKO sections including the military contingents. Similar limitations are apparent in the audits of the two largest PKOs of South Sudan #2105/167 and Darfur #2016/011, which had many contingents on the ground and covered large geographical areas. The South Sudan audit recommended recruiting inspectors and new mechanisms for remedial action. The Darfur report highlighted the need for better basic procedures to manage and report on equipment serviceability. Similar proposals to improve reporting and training were recommended for smaller PKOs such as Côte d'Ivoire # 2016/137 and Somalia # 2016/085.

Recommendations for Operations and Resource Management

- i. Mobilization: All COE should be inspected prior to deployment. This would decrease the amount of non-operational COE transported to the Mission area and reduce the burden of COE inspections undertaken locally in the Mission.
- ii. Fungibility: Member States should abolish the budgeted vacancy rate. PKOs should instead be funded for 100% of the approved staffing table. Savings at year-end should either be rolled over to next year or returned to DFS central reserve fund. At present, if during the budgetary process, a PKO is approved to have a budgeted vacancy rate of (for example) 90%, this assumes that 10 % of all posts will remain unfilled during the year and thus funding is only provided for 90% of the staff table. If the PKO succeeds in recruiting more than 90% of its staff table, it will incur an overspend.
- iii. Investment: Develop a comprehensive workforce plan that enables career development and flexible work conditions. The plan should be subject to annual review.
- iv. Accountability: Each manager should be accountable for maintaining a realistic staffing table. All posts vacant for 12 months should be abolished and then re-justified in relation to the current mandate. Staff contracts should be renewed only if there is a minimum satisfactory performance evaluation.
- v. Data: Better use of and timelier data (including greater efficacy of ERP systems, processes to monitor all aspects of ORM including staffing tables, COE and output of back-office centres).

3. Service Delivery Management

Whereas Supply Chain Management relates to acquiring equipment, moving it to the mission and controlling the assets, Service Delivery Management (SDM) is concerned with the utilization of those assets. Ineffective SDM impairs the mission's ability to function, sustain itself and ultimately to deliver on its mandate. SDM includes Aviation and Air Safety, Fuel Management, Vehicle Fleet/Ground Transportation, Engineering/Construction Projects, Medical Services/Counselling, Waste Management/Environment, Rations management and Facilities/Residences Management.

PKOs require Air assets (fixed wing aircraft and/or helicopters) to transport goods and people around the Mission area. PKO mandates cover an entire country and thus Missions need the capability to build and supply regional offices and to shift military personnel and staff to where they are needed.

Vehicle fleets and ground transportation are also critical. PKOs import their own fire engines, water tanker trucks, fuel trucks and, occasionally, aircraft towing trucks. Central to both air and ground transportation is fuel, which must be stored safely and used in all locations of the host country. PKOs are also required to construct and manage many of their offices as well as residential accommodation for military contingents and for international staff. The engineering section is tasked with ensuring that the Mission has a safe and reliable electricity supply, often in under-developed locations. Similarly, PKOs are also required to supply food rations to all military contingents as well as to maintain a level of safe and dependable medical services.

Between 2013 and 2018, 31% of all audits were conducted on SDM activities (89 out of a total 288 audits) and received 33% of all audit Observations (482 out of a total of 1,439). Within the same period, 61% of all unsatisfactory audits (23 out of 38 unsatisfactory audits) and 65% of all unsatisfactory audit Observations (162 out of 249). were accounted for by SDM activities.

The key problems identified by the audits were:

- a) Inadequate planning procedures in Air Operations
- b) Under-resourcing and understaffing in Fuel Management
- c) Poor planning and governance of Vehicle Fleets
- d) Under-resourcing and poor planning in Engineering and Construction Projects
- e) Lack of capacity in Medical Services
- f) Poor Waste Management Practices
- g) Under-resourcing and poor contracting in Rations Management
- h) Weak Facilities Management

Aside from Human Resources and Local Procurement, Air operations and Fuel Management were the most frequently audited activities between 2013 and 2019 across all PKOs. Major challenges include recording fuel usage accurately, preventing theft, and ensuring the quality of fuel supplied to the PKO.

Table 13: Service Delivery Management: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by Audit Focus

SDM Activities		
Audit Focus	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Air Operations / Air Safety	14	90
Engineering and Construction Projects	13	64
Facilities / Residence Management	9	28
Fuel Management	14	85
Medical Services and Counselling	10	57
Quick Impact Projects	7	28
Rations Management	7	40
Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	13	73
Waste Management and Environment	9	45
Total	96	510

Table 14: Service Delivery Management: Status of Audit Reports by Audit Focus

SDM Activities				
Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Total
Air Operations / Air Safety	7		7	14
Engineering and Construction Projects	8		5	13
Facilities / Residence Management	7		2	9
Fuel Management	10		4	14
Medical Services and Counselling	8		2	10
Quick Impact Projects	6	1		7
Rations Management	5		2	7

Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	12		1	13
Waste Management and Environment	4		5	9
Total	67	1	28	96

Table 15: Service Delivery Management: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by UN Mission

SDM Activities		
UN Missions	# Of Audits	# Of Audit Observations
Abyei	5	23
Afghanistan	5	16
CAR	7	54
Côte d'Ivoire	8	51
Cyprus	1	10
Darfur	16	60
DRC	12	61
Iraq	6	25
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	8	38
Liberia	4	21
Mali	6	43
Somalia (UNSOS)	6	33
Somalia (UNSOA)	4	22
South Sudan	8	53
Total	96	510

Challenges, Audit Recommendations and Impediments to Reform

a) Inadequate Planning in Air Operations

Aviation and air safety are among the most critical, high-risk activities across all PKOs. Aircraft and helicopters are frequent targets for attacks. Without safe and dependable air routes, PKOs are unable to operate. Consequently, air operations need to be fully resourced and equipped before the Mission's operations in the host country can begin.

Missions control the tasking, routes, flight schedules and maintain runways and landing sites. However, the physical air frames are contracted from commercial firms that also provide the flight crews. This adds a critical contract management element to air operations. Aircraft and air crews must constantly be tested and assessed for operational readiness. Air operations frequently suffer from problems with cost recoveries and special (i.e., unscheduled or emergency) flight requests. Without robust procedures for both of these, air operations can quickly exceed its budget, potentially leading to the rejection of critical flight requests.

Air operations and aviation safety were the worst-performing PKO activity, receiving the largest number of unsatisfactory audits (6) and recommendations (57). The audits for Mali 2015/148 and 2018/012, demonstrate the serious problems faced by new and growing Missions. These included inadequate workplans, guidelines, training and scheduling and lax procedures for staff training, emergency response plans, landing sites, aircraft inspection, practice drills and special flight requests. Such 'unsatisfactory' audit recommendations also occurred in established PKOs including Côte d'Ivoire 2014/111 and Democratic Republic of Congo 2014/113 and 2016/040. These also highlighted the inaccuracy and reliability of the Aviation Information Management System used by PKOs to manage air operations.

Many of the problems identified by the audits stem from poor resourcing and preparation prior to deployment. Although such problems are pervasive across most Mission components, the visibility, criticality, and high risks associated with air operations make it one of the most vulnerable PKO activities. The structural rigidities in the initial deployment process have to date prevented improvement in this area.

b) Under-Resourcing and Under-Staffing in Fuel Management

In a volatile environment, fuel is among the most sought-after commodities along with food, water and cash. Local fuel supplies are often in high demand from competing parties, and fuel may be tampered with before it is delivered. Securing a safe and high-quality supply of jet fuel, diesel, and gasoline is thus a major challenge. Closely related is the problem of physical storage and distribution of supplies to UN stakeholders. Audit recommendations point to poor staffing, weak management, and lack of training as the causes of problems in fuel management, even when strong plans, policies, and reporting procedures are in place. This is particularly acute in the more remote regions of PKOs' operations.

The unsatisfactory audits of new and small PKOs (Mali 2015/050, Abyei 2013/085, and Somalia 2014/075) highlight the negative consequences of vacant posts and a lack of resources. These resulted in short supplies, poor environmental standards or costly thefts. Other consequences include slow payment to contractors, inadequate procedures for cost recoveries, and weak quality assurance. The main impediment to implementing audit

recommendations is the failure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to resource adequately the training, staffing and operations of fuel management. Fuel management is therefore an area where the gap is widest between policies, rules and procedures and operational reality.

c) Poor Planning and Governance of Vehicle Fleets

Missions of all sizes and lifecycles have difficulty in planning the deployment and maintenance of vehicles. Passenger vehicles are allocated to PKOs based on a formula that includes the number and level of Mission staffers. Traditionally, senior staff are allotted their own vehicles while junior staff required to share vehicles. As evidenced by the audits, allocation of vehicles within the PKO is challenging and politically contentious. Poor road conditions mean that maintenance costs can be high, and vehicles have a short life. This in turn requires a versatile cannibalization and disposal plan. A final challenge relates to the Mission's carlog system, which tracks the mileage of each vehicle and alerts the PKO to personal use mileage that must be recovered from staff. This labor-intensive process costs more to operate than the funds recovered.

Between 2013 and 2018, vehicle fleet/ground transportation was one of most heavily audited areas in PKOs, receiving the fifth-highest number of audit recommendations in a total of 13 audits. The unsatisfactory audit of Côte d'Ivoire 2014/152 demonstrates that even a well-established PKO can struggle with vehicle fleet management. The report criticized the PKO's Vehicle Establishment Committee (VEC) and recommended new procedures for driving tests, accidents, repairs, spare parts and timely vehicle write-offs. Problems with VECs, such as unclear terms of reference and poor procedures, are common across audits for other established PKOs such as Lebanon 2015/043, Iraq 2015/088 and Cyprus 2016/092, as well as very large and expanding PKOs such as South Sudan 2015/064.

Impediments to reform can be traced to the time required for a Mission to get mandate approval and the speed at which PKOs are expected to deploy. The initial number of vehicles allotted to a Mission is often inadequate to meet evolving operational requirements. This shortfall in turn affects maintenance and operational plans. The problems are exacerbated by under resourcing and poor staff training which make it difficult for PKOs to implement established policies and procedures. Audits on this issue repeatedly cite the same problem while failing to recognize the underlying causes.

d) Under-Resourcing and Poor Planning in Engineering and Construction Projects

Unsatisfactory audits tend to be more prevalent for PKO activities such as Engineering and Construction, where the effects of under-resourcing, poor planning, rigid procedures and inadequate training are quickly apparent. Engineering was the second worst PKO activity with 4 unsatisfactory audits and 25 recommendations. Engineering projects were one of the most frequently audited activities, with 13 audits and 64 recommendations in 2013-18.

Problems in engineering and construction particularly affect expanding Missions and Missions in host countries with weak logistics infrastructure. In South Sudan, for example,

a lack of resources and weak procedures undermined the Mission's construction efforts. Similarly, in Darfur, an established Mission covering a huge geographical area, the ability to relocate operations across the country was hampered by poor project management and weak procedures.

Construction problems arose even in stable environments; weak management and poor oversight resulted in additional taxation and permitting requirements during construction of the UN Regional Service Centre in Uganda. In the Central African Republic (an expanding PKO), a lack of training and poor implementation resulted in adverse environmental impact. The unsatisfactory audit of South Sudan 2015/123 highlighted the impact of vacant posts, which lead to poor management, tracking and reporting of engineering projects.

The major impediment to the implementation of the audit recommendations was poor pre-planning and slow deployment. Member States usually approve PKO mandates only once the politics of the host country have become volatile, which impairs planning. PKOs are then expected to operationalize immediately - before troop levels are confirmed, staff are recruited, and key construction supplies are procured.

e) Lack of Capacity in Medical Services

PKOs operate in dangerous locations with weak public health infrastructure and poor medical services. This requires the importation of medical supplies and services for PKO military personnel and civilian staff. Medical services must ensure sufficient coverage for all, from outpatient treatment to medical evacuations. Special Political Missions such as Afghanistan or Iraq that do not have a UN military contingent stationed in their host country are required to utilize local medical facilities and to provide their own medical services to fill any gaps. This is particularly challenging for female personnel and in remote locations away from PKO headquarters. Another challenge relates to problems in recovering medical costs from external partners (such as African Union forces in Somalia) or from other UN agencies.

The unsatisfactory audit 2013/113 of South Sudan highlighted many of the more common issues with medical services, even in established PKOs. The observations include the number of vacant posts, the lack of capacity amongst staff and the need for better training. These problems in turn led to poor practices such as inadequate incineration of medical waste.

Again, the main impediment to adopting the medical service audit recommendations is that PKOs are required to deploy very quickly once their mandate has been approved by UN Member States. Typically, mandates are approved when local infrastructure in the host country has deteriorated significantly. Consequently, PKOs tend to become over-reliant on military field hospitals and facilities to provide medical services.

f) Poor Waste Management Practices

Poor waste management is one of weakest elements of PKO operations, as evidenced by the 4 unsatisfactory audits and accompanying 22 recommendations between 2013 and 2018.

As with other SDM activities, waste management is affected by poor pre-deployment planning and inadequate resources. In addition, a Mission's environmental footprint is a low priority for PKO management, which tends to be reactive rather than proactive in this area. Responsibility for poor performance or bad consequences is diffuse, resulting in little accountability.

During 2013-18, waste management and the environment received 5 unsatisfactory audits (out of 39) that produced 27 (out of 255) unsatisfactory Observations. The audits reported that even large PKOs such as South Sudan, Darfur and Democratic Republic of Congo were plagued by poor management of waste material that in turn risked environmental damage. They highlight the need for more equipment (including waste treatment plants, storage tanks and incinerators), better planning, more training and more robust monitoring of environmental impact.

g) Under-resourced and Poorly Contracted Rations Management

As part of the agreement between UN Peacekeeping and Member State Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) PKO military contingents are provided with accommodations and rations. The bulk of rations are sourced from contractors in the host country. Each military contingent has its own regular practices and expectations when it comes to the provision and quality of rations. Rations management thus requires good planning (food deliveries are critical and cannot be delayed), good supply lines, strong logistics and careful management (storage facilities, disbursement practices, inspections and so forth). Effective coordination between the PKO, military contingents and local suppliers is critical. Shortcomings are conspicuous and have an immediate impact on the Mission's operational effectiveness.

Audits of established and growing Missions alike highlight rapid turnover of staff (especially in the early stages of Mission deployment) and poor contract management with local suppliers as common weaknesses. Recommendations include better training, more staff and improved facilities for both the civilian PKOs and military contingents alike.

h) Weak Facilities Management

Most host countries do not have the necessary physical infrastructure or adequate security environment to support a PKO at the time it is mandated. Consequently, Missions need to construct and manage their own facilities. In some PKOs (such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia) commercial accommodation is available for rent by individual staff. However, most PKOs must build safe accommodation for staff and in some cases (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) the security situation requires the PKO to construct heavily-protected residential and office compounds.

Facilities management problems include poor rent recovery from staff and poor maintenance schedules (see, for example, the unsatisfactory audit of Darfur 2015/046). The major impediment for implementation of audit recommendations (in common with most other SDMs) is the timing and deployment of PKOs. Other impediments include the lack of attention paid to this issue compared to key mandate-focused priorities. Typically, it

is seen as an issue only once a problem occurs or an audit identifies a gap. Moreover, it also deals primarily with staff, whose complaints can be managed internally, whereas problems relating to the host government, military contingents or external contractors can escalate rapidly.

Recommendations for Service Delivery Management

- i. Mobilization: Improve pre-deployment planning so that agreements are in place with the host government and service providers for medical services (including mental health) before the Mission starts.
- ii. Fungibility: HQ to conduct an annual review that either revises or maintains the levels of flexibility given to missions to allocate all local assets.
- iii. Investment: Adopt a real-time air operations and air safety system to enable better resourcing, management, and operations. Increase resources for fuel management, which should be directly supervised by higher-level management.
- iv. Accountability: Develop key performance indicators on the use of all SDM assets and incorporate into the monthly management accounts. Indicators should include metrics relating to the use of air assets, special flight requests, fuel usage and so forth.
- v. Data: Better use of data to monitor all aspects of SDM including air operations, engineering, transport, fuel, environment, medical services etc.

4. Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding in this context refers to the operational effectiveness of a PKO (such as the effectiveness of a program to improve the capacity of a local police force or the robustness of local government institutions). Despite the importance of this area, it is audited relatively infrequently (in only 15% of the 1,439 we reviewed). This is partly due to the difficulty of establishing quantifiable metrics. However, without effective Peacebuilding a mission might operate effectively on an administrative level yet still fail to meet its mandated objectives.

Each PKO mandate is unique, and operations evolve over a mission's lifecycle in response to events in the host country. During the startup stage, the primary objective is to improve security in the local environment and for the Mission itself. For example, during startup stage the Mission in Mali conducted de-mining, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes.

As PKOs mature, Missions focus more on capacity building and initiatives to develop government institutions and civil society organizations. Mature missions such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia, gradually shift resources towards programs dealing with the rule of law, human rights and humanitarian, civil and/or political affairs. In Afghanistan, the Mission helped support the conduct of elections.

Peacebuilding is measured in two ways. The first comprises 'substantive' activities that bear on the Mission's ability to achieve its mandate. Such activities include civilian protection, human rights, humanitarian affairs and gender parity. The second element covers the work of the military and maritime operations and the police and corrections operations within the PKO. These vary considerably according to the life cycle stage of the PKO and the specifics of its mandate.

The key problems identified by the audits were:

- a) Inadequate guidance for substantive activities
- b) Inadequate guidance for military/policing activities

Table 16: Peacebuilding: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by Audit Focus

Peacebuilding Activities		
Audit Focus	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	4	23
Communications, Public Information	4	35
DDR and Demining	5	25
Election Support	1	2

Gender Based Violence	3	16
Human Rights, Protection and Peace	7	37
Humanitarian Affairs	1	2
Military & Maritime Operations	5	28
Police and Corrections Operations	7	35
Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	3	11
Total	40	214

Table 17: Peacebuilding: Status of Audit Reports by Audit Focus

Peacebuilding Activities				
Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Total
Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	4			4
Communications, Public Information	4			4
DDR and Demining	4		1	5
Election Support	1			1
Gender Based Violence	3			3
Human Rights, Protection and Peace	5	1	1	7
Humanitarian Affairs	1			1
Military & Maritime Operations	4		1	5
Police and Corrections Operations	7			7
Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	3			3
Total	36	1	3	40

Table 18: Peacebuilding: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by UN Mission

Peacebuilding Activities

UN Missions	# Of Audits	# Of Audit Observations
Afghanistan	2	5
CAR	3	25
Côte d'Ivoire	2	5
Darfur	12	55
DRC	8	36
Guinea-Bissau	1	10
India-Pakistan	1	6
Iraq	1	5
Kosovo	1	8
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	4	24
Liberia	2	5
Mali	1	11
Somalia (UNSOM)	1	9
South Sudan	1	10
Total	40	214

Challenges, Audit Recommendations, and Impediments to Reform

a) Substantive Activities

Unlike other PKO administrative activities that utilize standardized rules, regulations, policies and procedures, peacebuilding activities are determined by the specifics of each Mission's mandate and the local conditions in the host country. Although the UN provides handbooks and documents to guide substantive peacebuilding activities, they are difficult to implement on the ground, due to the wide variation in local conditions, capacity, opportunities and geographical configurations. For example, the Civil Affairs Handbook²¹, published in February 2013, provides a broad roadmap for civil affairs but it lacks guidance for specific activities.

Only 27 of the 288 audits conducted between 2013 and 2018 related to programmatic (substantive) activities. The audits identified similar shortcomings in the planning, management, and resourcing of activities across all sizes and stages of PKOs. For example, the unsatisfactory audit of Côte d'Ivoire 2015/005 highlighted the poor overall

²¹ UN (2013), *United Nations Civil Affairs Handbook*, UN, New York, <https://doi.org/10.18356/34638006-en>.

management of the of the Mission's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. It also identified a lack of coordination with other UN agencies. The audit of the de-mining programme in UNFIL (Lebanon) 2017/118 identified management gaps including utilization of de-mining teams, development of KPIs, technical arrangements and ill-defined role of the Deputy Force Commander. In Afghanistan 2017/137, the audit highlighted the need for improved management of its political affairs programme in order to align the PKO's political strategy with its strategic objectives.

The major impediment to implementing audit recommendations in this area is the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness or impact of such activities on achieving the goals in the PKO's mandate. As a result, audit recommendations are often viewed in a more subjective light than those provided for the more rules-based and process-driven administrative elements of a PKO. In addition, there are relatively few audits conducted on these activities compared to operational aspects. Therefore, PKO staff and management have come to expect limited accountability in this area.

b) Inadequate guidance for military/policing activities

Military and policing activities of PKOs are guided by documents such as 'Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special political Missions'²². However, these documents are not sufficient to provide the required level of detailed and consistent guidance for new missions, which vary considerably. For example, Lebanon's military officers were tasked with conducting well-established military patrols along a highly militarized border. Darfur tasked contingents with patrolling undefined locations. Liberia stationed military patrols on the frontiers with neighboring countries.

Just 12 (4%) of the 288 audits related to military and police contingent operations, mostly in well-established PKOs. In the case of the partially satisfactory audit of the military patrolling of Lebanon 2017/090, recommendations focused on the need to prioritize joint patrols and to improve patrol mapping. In the case of the unsatisfactory audit of Darfur 2015/053 (a larger and more complex PKO), more fundamental issues were raised, including the need to improve patrol planning and oversight. With respect to police operations, the audit for Democratic Republic of Congo 2017/011 raised issues relating to resource management, planning and training, while the audit In Mali 2017/107 focused on specific issues related to camp construction.

It is challenging to develop clear and objective metrics for efficiency, because many of the activities involve external parties, where the PKO has limited or no responsibility or control. Consequently, conducting audits may be politically sensitive, and the audits often avoid touching on important issues, and issue recommendations that are subjective.

Recommendations for Peacebuilding

1. Mobilization and Accountability: Audit plans should pay greater attention to programmatic areas of the Mission's mandate in order to increase visibility and

²² <https://police.un.org/en/policy-united-nations-police-peacekeeping-operations-and-special-political-missions-2014>

accountability in this area. Lines of responsibility should be clarified. There need to be clear consequences for poor performance.

2. Data: Develop key performance metrics or benchmarks relating to programmatic areas of the Mission (political, humanitarian, communications and so forth) against which outcomes can be measured.

5. Planning

PKOs require detailed business planning, especially during the start-up and wind-down phases of their life cycle. As is well documented,²³ the majority of shipments of strategic stocks do not take place until after the Mission budget has been secured, by which time the PKO may have already been in existence for over 12 months. This leads to slow deployment and expensive last-minute shipments by air – without communications equipment or housing units, for example, troops cannot be deployed, and the mission cannot operate effectively.

Planning is complex due to the numerous stakeholders involved, including the host countries and multiple UN organizations. The Office of Internal Oversight Services conducted five audits in 2013-18 specifically related to “Planning and Business Continuity”. The most extensive were in Lebanon 2017/151, Somalia 2017/075 and Democratic Republic of Congo 2017/138. All three audits were graded as Partially Satisfactory and resulted in a total of 19 recommendations.

The key problems identified by the audits were:

- a) Inability of Missions to implement guidance
- b) Lack of clarity over governance
- c) Lack of follow-up and assessment mechanisms

Table 19: Planning Activities: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by Audit Focus

Planning Activities		
Audit Focus	# Of Audits	# Of Observations
Business Continuity & Planning	4	20
Downsizing Planning	1	0
Total	5	20

Table 20: Planning Activities: Status of Audit Reports by Audit Focus

Planning Activities			
Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Planning	4	1	5

²³ See for example <https://undocs.org/JIU/REP/2011/6>

Business Continuity & Planning	4		4
Downsizing Planning		1	1
Total	4	1	5

Table 21: Planning Activities: Number of Audit Reports & Observations by UN Mission

Planning Activities		
UN Missions	# Of Audits	# Of Audit Observations
DRC	1	9
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1	6
Liberia	1	0
Libya	1	1
Somalia (UNSOS)	1	4
Total	5	20

The audit reports demonstrate the interconnectedness of the three problem areas. For example, the Lebanon audit reported that UNIFIL had only partially completed the required continuity planning for disruptive events, one of the core elements of the UN's Organization Resilience Management System. Risk assessments were generic and did not clearly show how the identified risks impacted critical activities for purposes of developing mitigation strategies. Furthermore, the plans that did exist were often inconsistent and lacked clear governance structures. Finally, many of the plans were outdated and were not regularly reviewed or tested.

The Somalia audit showed that the Mission had put in place business continuity plans with the required governance structure. However, the plans were outdated and covered only part of the Mission's operations (Mogadishu, but not Nairobi or Mombasa in Kenya). Moreover, staff were not adequately trained to implement the plans in case of disruption.

The Lebanon audit recommended that UNIFIL (i) develop and execute a plan to implement the Organization Resilience Management System (ORMS), with detailed roles and responsibilities and target implementation dates; and (ii) appoint and train staff with ORMS responsibilities as part of their individual annual performance work plans. The Mission should also establish a clear governance structure for crisis management and ensure regular updates. Management accepted all of these recommendations; however, no subsequent audits have been conducted to assess compliance.

In Somalia the audits recommended establishing maximum tolerable periods for resumption of critical services following disruptive events. Missions should also periodically conduct and document risk assessment and impact analyses for all Mission

areas, develop appropriate mitigation strategies, update business continuity plans and provide regular staff training. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the audit recommended updating the Business Continuity Plan with new risk assessments, identifying time-critical business services, and finalizing a communication plan.

The UN has taken some limited steps to address the planning shortfall. The DPKO and DFS have established joint teams to help large missions (including staff, police and military components) in planning and training. For smaller missions, group training is organized once a year at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy.

Challenges, Audit Recommendations and Impediments to Reform

The fast-paced and often volatile environments in which PKOs operate means it is tempting for them to view Planning and Business Monitoring as lengthy, reactive and labor-intensive exercises that quickly become Obsolete. However, this perspective ignores the improvements in efficiency that could be gained in a number of areas from improved planning and business continuity. Improved Planning could also close the gap between when a mandate is approved and when deployments are realistically expected.

First is the timing of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the host government. If these agreements were concluded quickly following Mandate approval it would enable a more rapid deployment of troops and police. Today the deployment process is often late and slow. Better planning would also make it more likely that the host Government is able to honor the agreements, which customarily include such important items as the provision of office buildings, logistical support and help with infrastructure and engineering.

Second, better infrastructure planning would enable preparation and construction of secure buildings, roads and airstrips as soon as a mandate is approved instead of waiting for agreement on the final budget. This would avoid situations where the PKO is “building the train when most of the travelers are already at the trackside.”

Third, better planning could mitigate the environmental impact of PKOs. The UN could enter into partnerships with donor countries to provide Missions with solar power generation, water treatment plants, fuel efficient cars, eco-friendly building materials and so forth. Fourth, development of standardized reporting of key performance indicators (KPIs) using web-based tools would enable better monitoring of PKOs and adoption of best practices, so that PKOs learn from each other and avoid repeating costly mistakes. For example, this could enable shipment of strategic stocks immediately after mandate approval based on past PKO deployments. Many such strategic stocks (air fleet, vehicles, camp buildings, office equipment) are purchased under HQ-managed global contracts. PKOs would then only be required to have a small function to procure local resources, such as bulk heavy building materials.

Recommendations for Planning

Applying sound Planning and Business Continuity tools and practices to a PKO could materially improve efficiency in all other areas, including Operations and Resource Management, Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery Management.

1. Mobilization: Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be agreed earlier at the HQ level, with as little as possible to be negotiated after the approval of a Mission by the Security Council (i.e., UN to obtain as many “on standby” commitments from TCC and PCCs as possible)
2. Investment: Implement consistent Planning for deployment of Strategic Stocks
3. Accountability: Monthly management reports to include commentary on each Mission’s attempts to apply PKO-wide Best Practices
4. Data: Adoption of Key Performance Indicators linked to data from UMOJA.

7. Conclusion

The past two decades have seen a number of attempts by the UN to reform its peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is not an easy task, and the shortcomings in the UN’s institutional machinery for building peace are well documented. A series of recent reforms have attempted to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping through a number of high-level organization restructurings.

Our paper focuses not on this policy level but on the detailed operational and administrative functions of peacekeeping missions that are critical to delivering performance on the ground. Our detailed analysis of hundreds of individual UN audit reports reveals a recurring pattern of managerial, financial, and operational weaknesses.

The weaknesses fall into five main categories: fiscal; supply-chain management; operations and resource management; service delivery management; peacebuilding; and planning. Taken together, they lengthen the time needed for missions to become operational, increase operating costs and reduce the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts.

Our analysis highlights a number of operational and administrative reforms that that would help address these issues and thus deliver significantly better outcomes. Importantly, they could be implemented within the existing UN peacekeeping structure, without requiring substantially increased resources or policy changes that touch on sensitive issues of control among the UN member states.

1. Foster a culture of data-driven decision-making. This requires key performance indicators that are quantifiable and are used to measure and assess management’s performance
2. Better advanced planning. Framework agreements should be negotiated and agreed in advance with member states in conflict zones so that missions can be deployed much faster when and if they are needed on the ground.

3. Missions have a similar lifecycle, from start-up through wind-down. Codifying and adopting detailed best-practices across all stages of this lifecycle would avoid the need to relearn basic procedures with each individual deployment.
4. Improve financial reporting process to improve control and prevent abuse. Delivery of prompt and accurate management accounts should be a key performance indicator. At the same time, missions should have greater flexibility to reallocate approved funds from one part of their budget to another as operational requirements necessitate.
5. Increase investment in human resources. Training, retaining and promoting key staff would pay large dividends in improving operation performance efficiency and propagating best practices.

In order to maximize their impact, reforms can be piloted in one mission, lessons learned, and then rolled out as standard operating procedure. Based on the UN's own audit analysis, returns from such initiatives are likely to be significant. Importantly, the need for effective UN peacekeeping is only likely to increase in coming decades, outstripping the UN's limited resources. This paper shows that there is much that can be accomplished, within existing budgets and political constraints, to foster more efficient operations and improved performance on the ground.

Appendix A: List of Recommendations

Fiscal Activities
Mobilization - Establish a Rainy-Day Fund equivalent to 25% of all PKO approved budgets from the prior year as a means to provide Missions with cash advances and greater flexibility and faster mobilization to be able to respond more quickly to rapidly developing operational needs
Fungibility - HQ to conduct an annual review to either revise or maintain the authority given for PKOs to redeploy resources within a budget period
Investment - Train all management in cash management and budgetary control (including results-based budgeting and zero-based budgeting)
Accountability - Fully utilize all UMOJA reporting tools, to produce real-time monthly management accounts.
Data - Change to Align all UN budget cycles within the UN Secretariat (HQ, PKOs and SPMs) and consider a shift to annual budgets to obtain uniformity in the budgeting process and improve financial planning.

Supply Chain Management
Mobilization – Increase the number of global contracts/procurement agreements and maximize the number of procurement processes that are completed prior to PKO deployment
Fungibility – Centralized warehousing should become mandatory at all regional logistics hubs and with each PKO
Investment – Non-PKO clients should pay in advance for requested support and implement a timely cost recovery mechanism for all services rendered to UN agencies and partners
Accountability - Enforce mandatory submission of financial disclosures and declarations of conflicts of interest for all procurement and control management staff and adopt a clear disciplinary policy for staffers who fail to follow standard procurement processes.
Data – Better use of real time data (including the efficacy of existing ERP systems, processes to monitor lead times of arrivals of purchases and develop key performance indicators across all areas of SCM.

Operations and Resource Management
Mobilization – All COE should be inspected prior to deployment thus decreasing the amount of non-operational COE transported to the Mission area and reduce the burden if COE inspections required to be undertaken in the Mission.
Fungibility – Member States should abolish the budgeted vacancy rate PKOs should instead be funded for 100% of the approved staffing table. Savings at year-end should either be rolled over to next year or returned to DFS central reserve fund. At present, if for example during the budgetary process, a PKO is approved to have a budgeted vacancy rate of 90%, this assumes that 10 % of all posts will remain unfilled during the year and funding is only provided for 90% of the staff table. In such an instance, if the PKO is able to recruit more than 90% of its staff table, it will incur an overspend.
Investment – Develop a comprehensive workforce plan that enables career development and flexible work conditions. The plan should be subject to annual review.
Accountability – Each manager to be accountable for maintaining a realistic staffing table. All posts vacant for 12 months, should be abolished and then re-justified in relation to the current mandate. No staff contracts to be renewed without a minimum satisfactory evaluation.
Data – – Better use of real time data (including the efficacy of existing ERP systems, processes to monitor all aspects of ORM including staffing tables, COE and output of back-office centres.

Service Delivery Management
Mobilization – Improve pre-deployment planning and agreements are in place with the host government and service providers for medical facilities and psychological services. Redeployment of engineering and facilities management resources.
Fungibility – HQ to conduct an annual review to either revise or maintain the levels of flexibility given to missions to allocate all local assets etc.
Investment – Adopt a real-time air operations and air safety system to enable better resourcing, management, and operations. Increase resources for fuel management, which should be directly supervised by higher-level management.
Accountability – Develop key performance indicators on the use of all SDM assets and incorporate into the monthly management accounts – i.e., metrics relating to the use of air assets/special flight requests, usage of fuel. Etc.
Data – Better use of real time data (including the efficacy of existing ERP systems, processes to monitor all aspects of SDM including air operations, engineering, transport, fuel, environment, medical services etc.

Peacebuilding
Mobilization and Accountability – IAD audit plans to pay greater attention to programmatic areas of the Mission’s mandate so as to increase the visibility and accountability of this area of the Mission’s work.
Data - Develop metrics or benchmarks relating to programmatic areas of the Mission (such as political and humanitarian, communications etc.) and consequences for poor performance in peacebuilding areas.

Planning
Mobilization - SOMA (Status of Mission Agreement) and the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) to be agreed earlier at the HQ level, with as little as possible to be negotiated after the approval of a Mission by the Security Council (i.e., UN to obtain as many “on standby” commitments from TCC and PCCs as possible).
Investment – Implement consistent Planning for deployment of Strategic Stocks.
Accountability – Monthly management reports to include commentaries of each Mission’s attempts to apply PKO-wide Best Practices.
Data – Adoption of Key Performance Indicators linked to the real time data from UMOJA.

Appendix B: Summary of Audits and Recommendations

1. Number of Audit Reports and Audit Observations by Mission

UN PKO Mission	# Of Audit Reports	# Of Audit Observations
Abyei	11	41
Afghanistan	13	41
CAR	16	112
Côte d'Ivoire	22	114
Cyprus	3	19
Darfur	44	170
DRC	39	196
Guinea-Bissau	1	10
Haiti	1	6
India-Pakistan	1	6
Iraq	14	54
Kosovo	1	8
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	27	139
Lebanon (UNSCOL)	2	11
Liberia	18	80
Libya	1	1
Mali	17	111
Somalia (UNSOA)	12	65
Somalia (UNSOM)	1	9
Somalia (UNSOS)	14	63
South Sudan	25	164
Syria	5	19
Total	288	1439

2. Number of Audit reports and Audit Observations by Problem Group

Problem Group	# Of Audit Reports	# Of Audit Observations
Service Delivery Management	96	510
Operations & Resource Management	69	339
Fiscal	19	73
Supply Chain Management	59	283
Peacebuilding	40	214
Planning	5	20
Total	288	1439

3. Audit Reports sorted by Audit Problem Groups

Problem Group	Partially Satisfactory (PS)	Satisfactory (S)	Unsatisfactory (U)	Total
Service Delivery Management	67	1	28	96
Operations & Resource Management	62	1	6	69
Fiscal	18	1		19
Supply Chain Management	50	3	6	59
Peacebuilding	36	1	3	40
Planning	4	1		5
Total	237	8	43	288

4. Status of Audit Observations sorted by the Audit Problem Groups

Problem Group	Partially Satisfactory (PS)	Satisfactory (S)	Unsatisfactory (U)	Total
Service Delivery Management	326	0	184	510
Operations & Resource Management	302	0	37	339
Fiscal	73	0		73
Supply Chain Management	244	3	36	283
Peacebuilding	200	0	14	214
Planning	20	0		20
Total	1165	3	271	1439

5. Audit Reports sorted by the Audit Problem Groups, including Audit Focuses

Problem Group and Audit Focus	Partially Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Total
Service Delivery Management	67	1	28	96
Air Operations / Air Safety	7		7	14
Engineering and Construction Projects	8		5	13
Facilities / Residence Management	7		2	9
Fuel Management	10		4	14
Medical Services and Counselling	8		2	10
Quick Impact Projects	6	1		7
Rations Management	5		2	7
Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	12		1	13
Waste Management and Environment	4		5	9
Operations & Resource Management	62	1	6	69
Back Office Service Centres	3		2	5
Conduct and Discipline	7			7
Contingent Owned Equipment	10	1	1	12
Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	14		1	15
Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	10		2	12
Individual Consultants / Contractors	5			5
Leave and Attendance	9			9
Records Management	2			2
Regional HQs	1			1
Welfare Activities	1			1
Fiscal	18	1		19
Accounting and Trust Funds	12	1		13
Budget Formulation and Monitoring	6			6
Supply Chain Management	50	3	6	59
Asset Management and Disposal	14	1	1	16
Movement and Control (MOVCON)	7	1	1	9

Procurement and Contract Management	25	1	2	28
Warehouse Management	4		2	6
Peacebuilding	36	1	3	40
Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	4			4
Communications, Public Information	4			4
DDR and Demining	4		1	5
Election Support	1			1
Gender Based Violence	3			3
Human Rights, Protection and Peace	5	1	1	7
Humanitarian Affairs	1			1
Military & Maritime Operations	4		1	5
Police and Corrections Operations	7			7
Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	3			3
Planning	4	1		5
Business Continuity & Planning	4			4
Downsizing Planning		1		1
Total	237	8	43	288

6. Audit Reports and Observations by Problem Area and Audit Focus

Row Labels	Count of Audit Number	Number of Observations
Service Delivery Management	96	510
Air Operations / Air Safety	14	90
Engineering and Construction Projects	13	64
Facilities / Residence Management	9	28
Fuel Management	14	85
Medical Services and Counselling	10	57
Quick Impact Projects	7	28
Rations Management	7	40
Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	13	73
Waste Management and Environment	9	45
Operations & Resource Management	69	339
Back Office Service Centres	5	20
Conduct and Discipline	7	42
Contingent Owned Equipment	12	46

Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	15	102
Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	12	53
Individual Consultants / Contractors	5	17
Leave and Attendance	9	38
Records Management	2	9
Regional HQs	1	3
Welfare Activities	1	9
Fiscal	19	73
Accounting and Trust Funds	13	55
Budget Formulation and Monitoring	6	18
Supply Chain Management	59	283
Asset Management and Disposal	16	71
Movement and Control (MOVCON)	9	37
Procurement and Contract Management	28	138
Warehouse Management	6	37
Peacebuilding	40	214
Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	4	23
Communications, Public Information	4	35
DDR and Demining	5	25
Election Support	1	2
Gender Based Violence	3	16
Human Rights, Protection and Peace	7	37
Humanitarian Affairs	1	2
Military & Maritime Operations	5	28
Police and Corrections Operations	7	35
Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	3	11
Planning	5	20
Business Continuity & Planning	4	20
Downsizing Planning	1	0
Total	288	1439

Figure 1: Number of PKO Audit Observations by Problem Group





Figure 2: Summary of PKO Audit Observations by Problem Group



Appendix C: List of Audits

Audit #	Mission	Audit Focus	Problem Area	Problem Group	Status	# Of Observations
2013 /062	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	6
2013 /064	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Air Transportation (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	7
2013 /077	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2013 /080	UNAMID (Darfur)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2013 /085	UNISFA (Abyei)	Fuel Management (U)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	U	7
2013 /090	UNSOA (Somalia)	Use of Official Vehicles in Kenya (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2013 /094	UNDOF (Syria)	Evacuation and Other Related Entitlements (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2013 /096	UNMIL (Liberia)	Engineering Activities (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2013 /099	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Local Procurement of Goods and Services (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2013 /100	UNAMID (Darfur)	Movement Control Operations (S)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	S	0
2013 /103	MONUSCO (DRC)	United Nations Police Operations (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	3

2013 /104	MONUS CO (DRC)	Local Procurement of Goods and Services (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2013 /106	UNISFA (Abyei)	Asset Management (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2013 /111	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Civil Affairs Programme (PS)	Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	Peacebuilding	PS	5
2013 /112	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Regional Headquarters (PS)	Regional HQs	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2013 /113	UNSOA (Somalia)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	4
2013 /113	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Medical Services (U)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	U	10
2013 /114	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Medical Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2013 /115	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	1
2013 /116	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	5
2013 /117	UNMIL (Liberia)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	5
2013 /121	UNSCOL (Lebanon)	Security Operations and Administrative Functions (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2013 /125	MONUS CO (DRC)	Asset Disposal and Local Property Survey Board (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	5
2013 /126	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	8
2013 /129	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Human Rights Programme (PS)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	PS	2
2013 /132	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	2

2013 /134	UNMIL (Liberia)	Political, Policy & Planning Section (PS)	Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	Peacebuilding	PS	3
2013 /135	UNAMI (Iraq)	Medical and Staff Counselling Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2013 /141	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	5
2013 /142	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	6
2013 /144	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Aviation Operations (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	6
2014 /012	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2014 /017	MONUSCO (DRC)	Corrections Advisory Unit (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	5
2014 /018	UNMIL (Liberia)	Transport Operations (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2014 /026	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Accounts Receivable and Payable (with RSCE Entebbe) (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	7
2014 /027	UNMIL (Liberia)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2014 /028	UNAMID (Darfur)	Sudanese National Police Development Programme (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	3
2014 /031	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	9
2014 /033	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Pilot Implementation of UMOJA (ERP) system. (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	17
2014 /035	UNAMID (Darfur)	Corrections Advisory Activities (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	4

2014 /036	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Police Operations (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	7
2014 /042	UNAMI (Iraq)	Management of Accounts Receivable and Payable by Kuwait Support Office (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2014 /043	MONUS CO (DRC)	Accounts Receivable and Payable	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	4
2014 /044	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	5
2014 /048	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Waste Management (U)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	U	7
2014 /056	MONUS CO (DRC)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2014 /063	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Fuel Operations (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2014 /065	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Air Operations (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2014 /066	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Civilian Personnel Entitlements & Allowances (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	2
2014 /071	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Ground Transport and Heavy Engineering Equipment (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2014 /075	UNSOA (Somalia)	Fuel Management (U)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	U	8
2014 /076	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Quick Impact Projects (PS)	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2014 /086	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	1

2014 /093	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Medical Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2014 /094	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Air Operations (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2014 /101	UNMIL (Liberia)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	7
2014 /106	UNAMI (Iraq)	Engineering Projects (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2014 /107	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Quick Impact Projects (PS)	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2014 /111	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire D'Ivoire)	Air Operations (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	10
2014 /112	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Recruitment of National Staff (U)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	U	6
2014 /113	MONUS CO (DRC)	Air Operations (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	7
2014 /114	MONUS CO (DRC)	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation/Resettlement and Reintegration Activities (PS)	DDR and Demining	Peacebuilding	PS	3
2014 /118	UNFICYP (Cyprus)	Financial and Administrative Functions (S)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	S	1
2014 /119	UNMIL (Liberia)	Build Capacity of Liberian Police (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	2
2014 /123	UNSOA (Somali a)	Movement Control (U)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	U	7

2014 /124	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Environmental Protection (PS)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2014 /125	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Generator Maintenance (U)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	U	3
2014 /130	UNSOA (Somalia)	Information and Communications Technology Security (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2014 /132	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Procurement Activities (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	5
2014 /135	MONUSCO (DRC)	Support Functions Provided by the Kalemie Field Office (U)	Back Office Service Centres	Operations & Resource Management	U	6
2014 /137	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Management of Expendable Inventory (U)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	U	7
2014 /138	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Warehousing Facilities (U)	Warehouse Management	Supply Chain Management	U	5
2014 /141	UNSOA (Somalia)	Local Procurement (U)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	U	4
2014 /145	UNAMI D (Darfur)	UMOJA Deployment (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2014 /146	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2014 /151	MONUSCO (DRC)	Post Exchange Contract (U)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	U	5
2014 /152	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Vehicle Fleet Management (U)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	U	6
2014 /162	UNSOA (Somalia)	Implementation of UMOJA (ERP) System (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	8

2015 /002	UNSOA (Somali a)	Air Operations (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	6
2015 /005	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (U)	DDR and Demining	Peacebuilding	U	3
2015 /006	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Warehouse Operations (U)	Warehouse Management	Supply Chain Management	U	8
2015 /019	MINUS MA (Mali)	Recruitment of National Staff and Individual Contractors (U)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	U	5
2015 /025	UNISFA (Abyei)	Facilities Management (U)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	U	1
2015 /026	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Staff Development and Training (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2015 /027	UNSOA (Somali a)	Management of Warehouses (PS)	Warehouse Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	8
2015 /029	UNDOF (Syria)	Personal Entitlements and Allowances (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2015 /035	MONUS CO (DRC)	Quick Impact Projects (PS)	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2015 /036	UNIFIL (Lebano n)	Payments to Vendors (S)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	S	0
2015 /042	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Child Protection Programme (S)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	S	0
2015 /043	UNIFIL (Lebano n)	Vehicle Fleet Management (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2015 /045	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Gender Advisory Programme (PS)	Gender Based Violence	Peacebuilding	PS	2

2015 /046	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Management of Super Camp Facilities (U)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	U	3
2015 /053	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Patrolling by Military Contingents (U)	Military & Maritime Operations	Peacebuilding	U	5
2015 /054	MINUS MA (Mali)	Admin support to MINUSMA by UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (U)	Back Office Service Centres	Operations & Resource Management	U	4
2015 /055	MINUS MA (Mali)	Fuel Management (U)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	U	6
2015 /056	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Conduct and Discipline Function (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2015 /060	MONUS CO (DRC)	Procurement and Management of Contracts for Services (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2015 /061	MONUS CO (DRC)	Facilities Management (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2015 /063	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Security Sector Reform Programme (PS)	DDR and Demining	Peacebuilding	PS	2
2015 /064	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Vehicle Fleet Management (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	8
2015 /065	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Waste Management (U)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	U	5
2015 /066	MONUS CO (DRC)	Medical Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2015 /070	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Use of UMOJA (ERP) Deployment Guidelines (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	7
2015 /072	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5

	d'Ivoire)					
2015 /076	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Field Support Suite Applications (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /076	UNAMI (Iraq)	Field Support Suite Applications (PS) (With UNAMA and KJSO)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	6
2015 /082	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Engineering Support Services (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2015 /086	UNAMI (Iraq)	Kuwait Joint Support Office (with UNAMA) (PS)	Back Office Service Centres	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /087	MONUSCO (DRC)	Implementation of UMOJA (U)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	U	10
2015 /088	UNAMI (Iraq)	Vehicle Fleet Management (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	6
2015 /089	UNSOA (Somalia)	Contracts Management (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2015 /090	UNSOA (Somalia)	Recruitment of National Staff (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2015 /091	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Recruitment of National Staff and Individual Contractors (U)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	U	5
2015 /096	UNMIL (Liberia)	Recruitment of National Staff (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /105	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Migration of Electronic Mail System (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	9
2015 /106	MONUSCO (DRC)	Management of the Rations Contract (PS)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	3

2015 /109	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Conduct and Discipline Function (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /113	UNISFA (Abyei)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2015 /116	MONUS CO (DRC)	Waste Management (U)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	U	5
2015 /120	MONUS CO (DRC)	Recruitment of National Staff (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	6
2015 /123	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Management of Engineering Projects (U)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	U	7
2015 /124	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Implementation of the Electronic Fuel Management System (U)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	U	9
2015 /125	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Use of the UMOJA Deployment Guidelines (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /126	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Conduct and Discipline Function (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /127	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire D'Ivoire)	Conduct and Discipline Function (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	7
2015 /131	MINUS MA (Mali)	Use of UMOJA (ERP system) Guidelines (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	7
2015 /133	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	5
2015 /135	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Local Procurement of Goods and Services (S)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	S	2
2015 /138	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Civil Affairs Activities (PS)	Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	Peacebuilding	PS	5

2015 /140	MONUSCO (DRC)	Conduct and Discipline Function (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /148	MINUSMA (Mali)	Air Operations (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	11
2015 /150	MINUSCA (CAR)	Management of Rations (U)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	U	8
2015 /151	UNISFA (Abyei)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	1
2015 /152	UNAMID (Darfur)	Leave and Attendance Records (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	2
2015 /153	UNAMID (Darfur)	Use of Consultants and Individual Contractors (PS)	Individual Consultants / Contractors	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /154	UNAMID (Darfur)	Military Engineering Works (U)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	U	2
2015 /155	UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan)	Audit of the Military Observer Group (PS)	Military & Maritime Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	6
2015 /157	UNMIL (Liberia)	Conduct and Discipline (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	7
2015 /158	UNAMID (Darfur)	Integrated Mission Training Centre (PS)	Back Office Service Centres	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2015 /161	UNAMID (Darfur)	Humanitarian Assistance Programme (PS)	Humanitarian Affairs	Peacebuilding	PS	2
2015 /163	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Consultants and individual Contractors (PS)	Individual Consultants / Contractors	Operations & Resource Management	PS	1
2015 /163	UNAMI (Iraq)	Use of Consultants and Individual Contractors (PS) with UNAMA and KJSO.	Individual Consultants / Contractors	Operations & Resource Management	PS	1

2015 /167	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2015 /175	MONUS CO (DRC)	Construction Projects in the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe (RSCE) (U)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	U	6
2015 /177	MONUS CO (DRC)	Child Protection Activities (PS)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	PS	3
2015 /179	MONUS CO (DRC)	Sexual and Gender Based Violence Support (PS)	Gender Based Violence	Peacebuilding	PS	5
2015 /180	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Use of International Consultants and International Individual Contractors (PS)	Individual Consultants / Contractors	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2015 /181	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Waste Management (PS)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2015 /183	UNSOS (Somalia)	Asset Disposal and Local Property Board (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2015 /184	UNSOS (Somalia)	Rations Management (U)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	U	9
2016 /002	MINUS MA (Mali)	Contingent Owned Equipment (U)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	U	7
2016 /003	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Leave and Attendance Records (with Entebbe RSCE / MONUSCO / UNISFA) (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2016 /003	UNISFA (Abyei)	Leave and Attendance Records (RSCE for UNMISS/MONUSCO/ UNISFA) (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2016 /003	MONUS CO (DRC)	Leave and Attendance Records (RSCE, MONUSCO,	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5

		UNMISS, UNISFA) (PS)				
2016 /006	MINUSC A (CAR)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	6
2016 /007	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2016 /011	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	2
2016 /026	UNIFIL (Lebano n)	Leave and Attendance Records (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	1
2016 /028	UNMIL (Liberia)	Waste Management and Environmental Activities (U)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	U	5
2016 /029	UNMIK (Kosovo)	Administration of the Mission (PS)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	PS	8
2016 /040	MONUS CO (DRC)	Aviation Information Management System (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	8
2016 /044	MINUS MA (Mali)	Management of Rations (PS)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	8
2016 /045	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Contracts Management (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	2
2016 /050	MINUSC A (CAR)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2016 /051	MONUS CO (DRC)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2016 /053	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Engineering and Construction Activities (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2016 /055	UNISFA (Abyei)	Utilization of RSCE and other Mission's Logistical Arrangements and	Back Office Service Centres	Operations & Resource Management	PS	1

		Support Structures (PS)				
2016 /056	UNMIL (Liberia)	Downsizing Planning (Satisfactory)	Downsizing Planning	Planning	S	0
2016 /059	UNSOS (Somali a)	Consultants and Individual Contractors (PS)	Individual Consultants / Contractors	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2016 /061	UNIFIL (Lebano n)	Inventory Management (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2016 /064	UNAMA (Afghan istan)	Leave and Attendance Records (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2016 /065	MONUS CO (DRC)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2016 /067	UNAMI (Iraq)	Management of National Staff Recruitment (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	1
2016 /069	UNSCOL (Lebano n)	Management of the Office (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	7
2016 /070	UNAMI (Iraq)	Leave and Attendance Records (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2016 /073	MONUS CO (DRC)	Asset Management (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	8
2016 /075	MINUS MA (Mali)	Leave and Attendance Records (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2016 /076	UNISFA (Abyei)	Engineering Activities (U)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	U	7
2016 /080	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Asset Management (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2016 /082	UNDOF (Syria)	Property and Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	2

2016 /085	UNSOS (Somalia)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2016 /087	MINUSCA (CAR)	Medical Services (U)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	U	8
2016 /088	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Rations Management (PS)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2016 /089	MINUSCA (CAR)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2016 /092	UNFICYP (Cyprus)	Vehicle and Fuel Management (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	10
2016 /097	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Preparedness for UMOJA (ERP) Implementation (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	6
2016 /102	UNAMID (Darfur)	Military Camp Facilities (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	1
2016 /104	UNAMID (Darfur)	Asset Disposal Activities (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	2
2016 /108	UNAMID (Darfur)	Repairs and Maintenance of Vehicles (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	1
2016 /109	MINUSMA (Mali)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	10
2016 /110	UNMIL (Liberia)	Property Management (PS)	Warehouse Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	5
2016 /111	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	6
2016 /113	UNSOS (Somalia)	Medical Support (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2016 /116	UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau)	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (PS)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	PS	10

2016 /123	MONUSCO (DRC)	Preparations for Electoral Support Activities (PS)	Election Support	Peacebuilding	PS	2
2016 /131	MINUSCA (CAR)	Movement Control Operations (PS)	Movement and Control (MOVCON)	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2016 /132	MONUSCO (DRC)	Repair and Maintenance of Vehicles (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2016 /133	MONUSCO (DRC)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	12
2016 /137	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Contingent Owned Equipment (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	4
2016 /138	UNMIL (Liberia)	Contingent Owned Equipment (Effective)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	S	0
2016 /142	MINUSCA (CAR)	Engineering Projects (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	6
2016 /143	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Rations Management (PS)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2016 /145	UNSOS (Somalia)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2016 /146	UNSOS (Somalia)	Facilities Management (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2016 /151	MINUSMA (Mali)	Asset Management (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2016 /152	UNMIL (Liberia)	Archives and Records Management (PS)	Records Management	Operations & Resource Management	PS	6
2016 /153	UNAMI (Iraq)	Procurement Activities (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	5
2016 /154	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Facilities Management (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	2

2016 /158	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Phasing Out of Human Resources	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	2
2016 /159	UNSOS (Somalia)	Repairs and Maintenance of Generators (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2016 /160	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2016 /163	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Management of Rations Contracts (PS)	Rations Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2016 /165	MONUSCO (DRC)	Engineering Projects (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2016 /168	MINUSCA (CAR)	Air Operations (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	9
2016 /171	MINUSMA (Mali)	Management of Engineering Projects (PS)	Engineering and Construction Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	8
2016 /175	MINUSMA (Mali)	Quick Impact Projects (PS)	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2016 /177	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Archives and Records Management (PS)	Records Management	Operations & Resource Management	PS	3
2017 /011	MONUSCO (DRC)	Military Operations for the Protection of Civilians (PS)	Military & Maritime Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	7
2017 /020	UNSMIL (Libya)	Administrative Support to the UN Mission in Libya (PS)	Business Continuity & Planning	Planning	PS	1
2017 /025	MINUSCA (CAR)	Quick Impact Projects (PS)	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2017 /026	MONUSCO (DRC)	Outsourced Services (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2017 /027	UNMIL (Liberia)	Contracts Management & Administration (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	5

2017 /038	UNMISS (South Sudan)	General Services Contracts Management (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	8
2017 /042	MINUSC A (CAR)	Conduct and Discipline Function (PS)	Conduct and Discipline	Operations & Resource Management	PS	9
2017 /044	UNAMI (Iraq)	Medical Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	2
2017 /046	MINUSC A (CAR)	Recruitment of National Staff (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	8
2017 /048	UNMIL (Liberia)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2017 /051	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Aviation Safety Programme (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2017 /052	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Inventory and Assets Disposal During the Liquidation (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	7
2017 /053	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Camp Closure and Environmental Clean Up (PS)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2017 /054	MONUS CO (DRC)	Ground Transport Operations (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2017 /056	MINUS MA (Mali)	Expost facto Procurement cases (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2017 /057	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Maritime Operations (Letters of Assist and MOUs) (PS)	Military & Maritime Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	6
2017 /058	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Electronic Contingent Owned Equipment System (PS)	Contingent Owned Equipment	Operations & Resource Management	PS	10
2017 /060	MONUS CO (DRC)	Asset Disposals and Local Property Survey Board Activity (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	3

2017 /061	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Public Information Programme (PS)	Communications, Public Information	Peacebuilding	PS	8
2017 /066	UNSOS (Somalia)	Local Procurement (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	9
2017 /071	UNISFA (Abyei)	Recruitment of Staff (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	2
2017 /072	MONUSCO (DRC)	Warehouse Management (PS)	Warehouse Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	8
2017 /074	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Community Stabilization Programme (PS)	Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	Peacebuilding	PS	7
2017 /075	UNSOS (Somalia)	Business Continuity (PS)	Business Continuity & Planning	Planning	PS	4
2017 /078	MINUSCA (CAR)	Fleet Management (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	10
2017 /079	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Facilities Management (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2017 /089	UNSOS (Somalia)	Outsourced Services (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	2
2017 /090	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Military Patrolling Operations (PS)	Military & Maritime Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	4
2017 /091	UNAMI (Iraq)	Political Affairs Programme (PS)	Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	Peacebuilding	PS	5
2017 /092	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Commercial Activities (PS)	Welfare Activities	Operations & Resource Management	PS	9
2017 /099	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Medical Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2017 /101	MINUSMA (Mali)	Payment Processes (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	9

2017 /106	UNSOM (Somalia)	Protection of Women Against Sexual Violence (PS)	Gender Based Violence	Peacebuilding	PS	9
2017 /107	MINUSMA (Mali)	Police Operations (PS)	Police and Corrections Operations	Peacebuilding	PS	11
2017 /113	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Fiscal	PS	4
2017 /117	UNISFA (Abyei)	Air Operations (U)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	U	8
2017 /117	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Public Information Programme (PS)	Communications, Public Information	Peacebuilding	PS	10
2017 /118	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Demining Activities (PS)	DDR and Demining	Peacebuilding	PS	9
2017 /121	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Facilities Management (PS)	Facilities / Residence Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	4
2017 /123	UNAMID (Darfur)	Medical Services (PS)	Medical Services and Counselling	Service Delivery Management	PS	7
2017 /126	UNAMID (Darfur)	Trust Fund Activities (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	2
2017 /128	MONUSCO (DRC)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring (PS)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Fiscal	PS	1
2017 /129	MONUSCO (DRC)	Public Information Programme (PS)	Communications, Public Information	Peacebuilding	PS	8
2017 /130	MINUSCA (CAR)	Strategic Communications and Public Information (PS)	Communications, Public Information	Peacebuilding	PS	9
2017 /132	UNSOS (Somalia)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring (PS)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Fiscal	PS	0
2017 /136	UNDOF (Syria)	Finance and Human Resources Management (PS)	Accounting and Trust Funds	Fiscal	PS	5

2017 /136	UNDOF (Syria)	Finance and Human Resources Management (PS)	Field Support Suite / UMOJA / IT	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2017 /137	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Political Affairs Programme (PS)	Political Affairs, Policy and Planning	Peacebuilding	PS	3
2017 /138	MONUSCO (DRC)	Business Continuity (PS)	Business Continuity & Planning	Planning	PS	9
2017 /139	MINUSCA (CAR)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring (PS)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Fiscal	PS	7
2017 /140	UNFICYP (Cyprus)	Procurement, Contract Management, Medical Services (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	8
2017 /141	UNAMID (Darfur)	Protection of Civilians Programme (PS)	Civil Affairs and Civilian Protection	Peacebuilding	PS	6
2017 /142	MINUSMA (Mali)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring (PS)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Fiscal	PS	3
2017 /144	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Electronic Security System Project (PS)	Procurement and Contract Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	4
2017 /145	UNSOS (Somalia)	Waste Management (PS)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	PS	8
2017 /147	UNAMI (Iraq)	Air Operations and Aviation Safety (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2017 /148	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Budget Formulation & Monitoring (PS)	Budget Formulation and Monitoring	Fiscal	PS	3
2017 /151	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Business Continuity (PS)	Business Continuity & Planning	Planning	PS	6
2017 /153	UNAMI (Iraq)	Fuel Management (PS)	Fuel Management	Service Delivery Management	PS	5

2017 /154	UNSOS (Somali a)	Warehouse Management (PS)	Warehouse Management	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2018 /008	UNISFA (Abyei)	Quick impact Projects	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	S	0
2018 /010	MINUJU STH (Haiti)	Assets Disposal During Liquidation of Mission (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	6
2018 /012	MINUS MA (Mali)	Aviation Safety (PS)	Air Operations / Air Safety	Service Delivery Management	PS	5
2018 /014	UNAMI D (Darfur)	Quick Impact Projects (PS)	Quick Impact Projects	Service Delivery Management	PS	3
2018 /015	UNMIL (Liberia)	Human Resources (Phasing Out) (PS)	Human Resources, Recruitment and Training	Operations & Resource Management	PS	5
2018 /018	UNMISS (South Sudan)	Leave and Attendance (with RSCE) (PS)	Leave and Attendance	Operations & Resource Management	PS	9
2018 /020	UNMIL (Liberia)	Asset Disposal (PS)	Asset Management and Disposal	Supply Chain Management	PS	3
2018 /023	MINUSC A (CAR)	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (PS)	DDR and Demining	Peacebuilding	PS	8
2018 /024	MINUSC A (CAR)	Human Rights Programme (PS)	Human Rights, Protection and Peace	Peacebuilding	PS	8
2105 /107	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	Waste Management (U)	Waste Management and Environment	Service Delivery Management	U	5
2105 /108	UNSOA (Somali a)	Fleet Vehicle Management (PS)	Vehicle Fleet and Ground Transportation	Service Delivery Management	PS	6

Appendix D: UN Peacekeeping Reforms 1992-2019

Over the years many attempts have been made to reform the UN and its Peacekeeping Operations. Reforms have tended to focus on five main areas:

- Funding of PKOs
Structure and Reform of the UN Secretariat and the deployment of Troops and Police
- Budget Process.
- Budget Formats and Accounting Treatment
- Budget management Tools and Practices.

Of these five main areas, by far the bulk of the reform initiatives have been high level and have focused primarily on the first two (Funding of PKOs and the UN Secretariat Structure). The major reforms follow below:

(1992) A-47 277 and S-24111 An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. This emphasized, preventative diplomacy, the need for clearer mandates and commitments from TCC/PCC. The annual PK budget was \$3bn (by comparison, global defense spending was approximately \$1.2tr²⁴). Recognized the PK was short of funds and presented proposals to remedy cash flow, e.g., create a 450m revolving humanitarian fund and establish a \$1b peace endowment fund.

(1997) GA-A-51-950. Renewing the UN. A Programme for Reform. Suggested a Revolving Credit Fund capitalized at \$1b established through voluntary contributions and that any unspent balances under the regular budget. Suggested the integration of 12 UNHQ entities into 5. Set up the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Proposed Results Based Budgeting (Implemented -51-950 Add 6 in November 1997). Highlighted that the Regular Budget was underfunded, and cash flow was a problem. Presented HR management reforms.

(2000) UNGA Brahimi Report. Proposed: 1. An increase in resources given to PKOs. 2. A robust PK doctrine 3. Clearer mandates 4. Mandates in draft form until SG confirms troops / other logistics are in place. 5. HQ increase information management and strategic analysis 6. Rapid deployment standards and on call expertise 7. Transparent and decentralized recruitment process. 8. Establish and integrated mission task force for PKO planning and support 9. Move PK budgeting and procurement from DM (Division of Management) to DPKO. 10 A new field focused system and processes for procurement (to assist rapid deployments). 11. SG to have authority up to \$50m without the ACABQ to redeploy resources quickly. 12. More flexibility for STSGs in the field to fund QIPs (Quick Impact Projects). Better PK leadership and management. 13. A new global support strategy 14. Strategic deployment stocks and start up kits.

(2004) UNSG Post Brahimi UN Reforms Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Proposed. 1. Trust Funds and other mechanisms to assist rapid deployments 2.

²⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database" <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

SRSBs to have authority/guidance to establish robust donor coordination mechanisms and obtain resources and ensure the sequencing of UN assessments and activities are consistent with government priorities. 3. Establish a standing fund of \$250m for PK to finance recurrent expenditures of a nascent government and critical agency programs. 4. More involvement in PK decision making from donors, TCC and PCC (especially in participation of PKOs, contributions to voluntary activities. 5. The role of the peacebuilding Commission 6. The SG HR reforms of 1997 and 2002 to be implemented without delay. 7. Rules of PK budget to be amended to give the UN the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions. 8. Strategic Deployment Stocks and standby arrangements.

(2005) UNGA Post Brahimi UN Reforms 2005 – World Summit Outcome. Proposed. 1. Development of best practices for predictable financing for early recovery activities. 2. Extend the period of attention of the international community for post-conflict recovery. 3. Establish a multi-year peacebuilding fund for post conflicts, funded by voluntary contributions 4. Member States to pledge adequate resources for PK. 5. Create a standing police capacity 6. Establish a peacebuilding Commission (members to include TCC/PCC/SRSG/Human rights Commission/Regional and International institutions/Major Donors. 7. UN rules, budget, finance, HR to response to current needs to be factored into the budget. 8. GA and organs to review mandates over 5 years old. 9. SG to make best effort to use resources efficiently (clear rules and procedures), best management practices, use ICT better. 10. Possibility of staff buy outs. 11. Importance of the independence of OIOS.

(2006) Post Brahimi UN Reforms. Peace Operations. 2010 Reform Strategy (SG report A-60-696) – Reforms in DPKO: Proposed. 1. The need to further develop relations with international financial institutions. 2. Five areas where DPKO can cooperate better with the World Bank. 3. In 2005 (5 years after Brahimi in 2000), DPKO prepared a reform strategy “Peace Operations 2010” proposing reforms on (a) personnel (b) doctrine (c) partnerships (d) resources (e) the organization. 3. Personnel (need to recruit and retain highly qualified personnel by providing structures and support to build a career in PK. 4. Doctrine of PK Best Practices Section (PBPS) is doing good work. 5. 2006/2007 DPKO to strengthen the Police Division. 6. DPKO to establish integrated organizational structures at HQ and in the field. 6. Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office already established by the GA will help to integrate mission planning at start up and throughout the mission lifecycle.

(2006) GA A-60-692. Investing in the UN for a Stronger Organization Worldwide. 1. Between 1990 and 2006 there were 42 new missions. 2. Provided data on the growth of the PK budget and personnel. 3. Data on the rapid growth of the UN budget 1996 to 2006. 4. Budget process is cumbersome (150 trust funds, 37 distinct PK accounts each with their own support costs/arrangements. Process is very manual and fragmented. Not enough delegation 5. Proposed reforms to shorten the cycle for the review of budgets and consolidate budget appropriation from 35 to 13 sections / extend SG authority to redeploy posts and use savings from vacant posts / consolidate PK accounts / streamline trust fund management / increase working capital and commitment authorities granted by the GA / re-engineer finance processes to allow significant delegation of authority within the framework of accountability.

(March 2007) – Strengthening the Capacity of the Organization in Peacekeeping Operations.

1. The GA supports the restructuring of DPKO and establishes DFS. 2. SG to provide report on functions, budget discipline and financial implications 3. SG to abide by the 2007 Special Commission on PK operations to guarantee the unity of command to promote the integration of efforts and strengthen operational capacities at HQ and Field Missions.

(2007) UNGA Creating DFS (OIOS Recommendations) 1. Update mandates for SPMs 2. DPK) to establish base line staffing and funding levels for HQ support to PK. 3. Review roles and responsibilities of DM vs DPKO. 4. Develop career development programs 5. Ensure “Peace operations 2010” initiatives lead to an action plan for terms of reference, cooperation, coordination, information sharing with peace partners. 6. Finalize the terms of reference for integrated mission task forces 7. DPKO to improve management structures (if the integrated matrix organizational model is adopted) 8. Develop an internal communications strategy 9. Have a Change management office to lead efforts of the “Peace Operations 2010” reforms. 10. The RBB framework to be linked to sub programs. 11. DPKO and DM to identify rule revisions to cater for increasingly complex PKOs. 12. Develop internal controls for procurement delegated from DM 13. A new delegation of authority for HR. 13. DFS to get delegations of authority for procurement. 14. DPKO to promulgate new business processes, accountability structures, internal delegations of authority. 15. Establish a risk management mechanism. 16. Strengthen the monitoring and evaluation function in O/SG.

(July 2007) Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of Financing Peacekeeping Operations Cross Cutting Issues. Proposed 1. Planning to be as effective as possible prior to deployment and draw on lessons learned and best practices 2. The SG to improve budget assumptions and forecasts. 3. Plans to forecast in mandates and the specifics of each PKO. 4. Budget and performance reports to include decisions relating to PKO’s budget implementation including those related to Operational costs 5. Too many cancelled prior period obligations 6. The planning phase to include operational, logistical, financial aspects by linking RBB to mandate implementation. 6. Recruit more national staff. **7. International vacancies not to be used as a budgetary tool.** 8. Need full justification for new posts. 9. SG to ensure DoA for recruitment is accompanied with accountability 10. More training 11. Use of series 300 and 100 contracts 12. Faster disability claim processing (especially for troops). 13. More rapid troop deployments. 14. Better internal controls 15. Air operations does not reflect reality 16. Better fuel management 17. QIPs over 3 years OK if justified 18. Better procurement (effective, transparent, cost effective, more local) 19. Better regional coordination and with UNCT. 20. TCC/PCC status of liabilities and reimbursement is too slow.

(2007) UNGA Strengthening the Capacity of the United Nations to Manage and Sustain PK Operations. Proposed. 1. Adequate resources is key 2. Support accounts only used for financing HR and non-HR needs for backstopping PK operations at HQ – any changes to this limitation needs GA approval. 3. Not agree to transfer \$13.8m excess of authorized level of PK reserve fund to 2006 – 2007. 4. Approves requirements 2007 – 08 \$230.5m 5. Detailed instructions from the SC on funding sources for 2007 – 08 PK missions. 6. Good partnerships SC/TCC/PCC/Other MS 7. Agree establishment of DFS 8. Better define role of D/SG (especially re DFS, DPKO, DM and DPA). 9. USG DFS report to USG DPKO (but not to set a precedent). 10. Establish new ASG military Affairs, ASG RoL, D-1 procurement etc. 11.

DPKO/DFS work closely re RBB framework and performance evaluation / new ERP / information management strategy / reform initiatives and implementation of related processes / communication policy / implementation of oversight body recommendations. 12. Outlined reporting lines 13. SG to clarify responsibilities and financial authorities of all mission heads 14. Deep analysis of HR and financial resources and policies need more efficient mandate implementation 15. Recalls Res 60/268 and reiterates the request to the SG to submit findings of the analysis of evaluation of the Support account. 16. Need to increase effectiveness of the Support Account to improve the administration and management of PKOs.

(2009) DPKO-DFS Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping 1. When SC considers a new mission DPKO/DFS will present the SC a full range of support actions MS/regional partnerships might provide to expedite. 2. Emphasizes the need for 6 months heads up on mandate approval to deploy advance planning capabilities 3. SC craft achievable mandates 4. SC agree to a phased approach for future PKOs (TCC/PCC pledges, mission objectives resource availability). 5. DPKO/DFS recommendations for establishing and managing missions and building capacity. 6. Gives data on cost drivers for field operations. 7. DPKO-DFS gives recommendation for delivery in the field, identifies critical shortages in PKO needs. 8. Identifies a new Field Support Strategy.

(Dec 2009) UNGA Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 1. Building blocks for future effectiveness (a) protection of civilians (b) robust PK (c) Peacebuilding tasks to be undertaken 2. Fill critical personnel gaps 3. Training 4. GFSS (Global Field Support Strategy) – see below 5. Integrated Operating teams 6. Clearer mandates needed 7. The setting of capability standards.

(Jan 2010) UNGA Global Field Support Strategy. 1. Funding for the establishment of new or expanding missions / initiatives. 2. Approval of resources for new operations. 3. Financing of new operations. 4. Global Service Centre. 5. Regional Support Centre (Entebbe) – quantified costs and benefits. 6. An integrated HR framework 7. Describes GFSS strengthened resource management frameworks and critical support challenges.

(2010) UNGA Peacekeeping Cross Cutting Issues. 1. All PKOs to have adequate resources. 2. GA recognizes the challenges of providing logistics, admin and ICT support to PKOs. 3. Timely PKO startups is key. 4. Requests SG to submit proposals for a standardized funding model for the first year of a PKO operation 5. Notes with interest the concept of GFSS. 6. HQ has a central role for strategic policymaking and oversight over rule, regulations and procedures. Confirms establishment of RSCE (Entebbe). 7. SG to be wary of single source/multifunctional contracts when developing proposals for further logistics modules (GFSS) 8. SC responsible for admin and budget matters 9. GA sole authority to approve ACABQ recommendations 10. DoA to SG as CAO to better manage the UN 11. SG authorized \$100m start up from PK Reserve Fund (without referring to ACABQ) 12. Balance of PK Reserve Fund not to exceed \$100m. 13. SG can enter into commitments up to \$50m for start-ups if the balance is available from strategic deployment stocks (SDS). 14. HQ is accountable for acquiring air assets. 15. SG to intensify efforts for Economies of Scale with and between PKOs and better coordinate between missions and DPKO/DFS/DM/HQ/PKOs. 15. Too many prior period obligations cancelled. 16. Backlog of death/disability payments. 16. Fuel management a big risk 17. SG to use UNLB (Brindisi) more 18. Economies of Scale

needed in Air Operations 19. QIPs needs more flexible procedures. 20. TCC/PCC reimbursements too slow. 21. Modularized service packages at UNLB are a good idea.

(Oct 2010) DPKO-DFS Progress Report No. 1 on Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping

Key themes. 1. Global partnerships. 2. Clear political strategy and direction 3. GFSS 4. Projecting future needs. 5. Clear achievable objectives 6. Cohesive mission planning and management 7. Faster deployment crisis management 8. Capability-driven approach.

(2011) – November Management Reform at the UN (Division of Management). The 2005 World Summit incorporated a broad range of management reforms and established a management committee and management performance board as well as the procurement Division management structure. It also introduced in 2006, senior management compacts / established an ethics office / frameworks for conduct issues in PKOs / the financial disclosure program / an independent audit advisory committee / a new internal justice system / reporting on decorations and favors / a framework for enterprise risk management / strengthened procurement / post-employment restrictions / a senior vendor review committee / HR reform programme / HR Management and workforce planning / UMOJA (ERP system) / IPSAS / An ICT global ICT strategy / Delivering as One.

(2014) ACABQ Observations and Recommendations on Cross cutting Issues Relating to PK Operations. 1. Major discussion document on all aspects of process rules and reforms. 2. Current budget practices may lead to over budgeting. 3. Time lag in budgets is not good. 4. ACABQ does not like cross subsidization between missions. 5. Asset transfers needs reviewing (especially from UNLB) 5. Discusses budget implementation rates. 6. Per capita cost of troops is not a useful indicator of PK efficiency 7. Important to differentiate between variances due to efficiencies and those due to mandate change. 8. HR vacancy rates are used as a budgetary tool. 9. UMOJA and IPSAS. 10. Property management and better planning required in all phases of PKOs.

(Nov 2014) What Needs to Change in UN Peace Operations – An Expert Briefing Book for HIPPO. A Major document detailing many suggested reforms. 1. Different Models suggested. 2. Creating partnerships for future PKOs in Africa. 3. AU Missions transitioning to UNPK e.g., Mali. 4. Cooperation between the AU and other regional organizations. 5. Partnerships and fragile states. 6. Inputs for the HL panel on peace operations. 7. Clearer mandates addressing the expectations gap. 8. UN payers need to lift the arbitrary cap on PK expenditures so that resources can be Mission specific. 9. Finance issues including evaluation and troop reimbursement (moving to unit-based reimbursement for TCC equipment. 10. Proposals on SPMs. 11. Rapid deployment and force generation. 12. Improved troop planning 13. Better TCC capacity 14. CIVPOL reforms. 15. UN security and management leadership reforms (training and capacity building) 16. Restructuring of the life cycles of PKOs 17. Strategic Communications.

(2015) HIPPO Report (High Level Panel) 1. More reliable, sustained resourcing and political support. 2. Four essential shifts (a) politics to have primacy (b) stronger future peace and security partnerships (c) UN security more field focused and PKOs more people centered, better TCC capacity and speed of deployment. (d) HQ structures to support better a field orientated agenda. 3. UN admin support policies procedures and authorities to be revised.

4. Full spectrum of peace operations more flexible and better planning, analysis and mandating.

(2015) The challenge of sustaining peace: Report of the advisory group of experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture. Identified peacebuilding as an under-prioritized, under-resourced afterthought that suffers from the fragmentation of the UN “silos.” The Group called for the following: 1. Greater coherence at the intergovernmental level 2. Improved peacebuilding capability 3. More predictable financing. 4. Increasing Peacebuilding Fund funds. 5. Better leadership.

(Jun 2016) Global Service Delivery Model Presentation. 1. A presentation of the timing, mission, guiding principles from A-70-323. 2. The benefits of GSDM (HR, payroll, procurement, organizational design, finance, travel).

(2017) Shifting the Management paradigm in the United Nations: Improving and streamlining the programme planning and budget process. 1. The current planning and budgeting cycle takes in excess of five years, from the initial preparation of the strategic framework until the final consideration of the financial statements and the related performance reports. The protracted nature of the process means that plans and budget proposals are formulated well in advance of the period to which they relate, as a result of which they do not always reflect the impact of new and emerging mandates that arise during budget implementation. 2. The impact of newly emerging mandates on the biennial programme plan are dealt with separately from the programme plans and budgets for extended periods, until the following biennial period. The documentation submitted for this process is voluminous and labour-intensive 3. During budget implementation, the Secretary-General has no authority to shift resources between programmes without the prior approval of Member States 4. The existing limits to the level of the Working Capital Fund and the authority granted to the Secretary-General in committing funds for unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures no longer reflect the current needs of the Organization if it is to operate with an acceptable cash risk and if it is to respond effectively to urgent emerging demands, not only for peace and security, but also in the other two main pillars of the Organization. The change proposals concern three main areas: (a) the planning and budgeting process itself; (b) the documentation currently prepared during the course of that process; and (c) the use of exceptional funding and operational arrangements. 1. Replacement of the current biennial budget with an integrated annual programme budget. 2. Replacement of the current plan outline as part of the strategic framework with a stand-alone plan outline report to cover a period of 5 years. 3. Consolidation of 9 existing reports. 4. Revisions in the results framework along with a streamlined presentation and a focus on performance reporting. 5. Aggregation of financial resources. 6. Integration of SPM budgets into the integrated annual programme budget (i.e., creation of a separate section for SPMs and that would be submitted in the budgets prepared in April). 7. Changes to the financial statements. 8. Exceptional funding and operational arrangements. 9. Managerial authority to redeploy post-related financial resources within budget parts. 10. Managerial authority to redeploy post-related financial resources to non-post items within a budget section. 11. Broadening of the mechanism for the commitment of unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. 12. Increase the commitment

authority threshold for additional resource requirements resulting from SC decisions. 13. Adjustment in the Working Capital Fund from \$150m to \$350m).

(2017) Restructuring of the United Nations peace & security pillar. Report of the Secretary-General. Aimed to reduce “the fragmentation of efforts and ensuring a more joined up, whole-of -pillar approach to the delivery of mandates” by proposing the following: 1. Creating the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and a Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2. Creating a single political-operational structure under Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities reporting to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations. 3. Establishing a Standing Principals’ Group of the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations. 4. Enhancement of certain priority areas to ensure coherence and coordination across the peace and security pillar. 5. Introduction of several non-structural changes.

(2018) Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary-General. Seeking “an ecosystem of partners working in support of governments is critical for sustaining peace”. The SG calls for strengthening partnerships at every stage along the peace continuum, placing greater emphasis on national ownership and supporting national actors to develop the national capacities needed to address structural inequalities. 1. Shifts the primary agency for sustaining peace from the international to the national and local level. 2. Broadens the institutional responsibility for peace to the whole UN system by leveraging the three pillars of UN engagement—peace and security, development, and human rights, in addition to humanitarian action — to generate sustaining peace outcomes. 3. Switches the focus of the UN from its current emphasis on re-active capacities to a pro-active approach to responding to emerging risks of violent conflict.

(January 2018) Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly. 1. Stress accountability as a central principle of reform. 2. Emphasizes the reforms should be integrated, coherent, and mutually reinforcing. 3. Approves the change from a biennial to an annual budget period on trial basis beginning with the programme budget for 2020.

(December 2018) Delegation of authority in the administration of the Staff Regulations and Rules and the Financial Regulations and Rules. A new framework for delegation of authority was implemented on January 1, 2019, in order to decentralize authority and streamline operations and clarify roles, responsibilities, and accountability. 1. SG delegating authorities to heads of entity globally. 2. The Department of Management (DM) and Department of Field Support (DFS) were reorganized into two new departments: A Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) focused on management strategy, policy development and compliance, and a Department of Operational Support (DOS), providing support to managers with global operational and transactional services.